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ABSTRACT 
FORMATION OF U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT ECONOMIC FOREIGN 
POLICY FOR THE OCCUPATION OF POSTWAR GERMANY, 
 1939-1948 
 
 
by 
 
 
Rick Jeffers 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Winson Chu 
 
This study examines how a firm belief in the economic doctrine of multilateralism 
triggered a powerful policy-determining crusade within the U.S. State Department. This 
doctrine was fundamental to the establishment of postwar foreign policy toward 
Germany. It was present in 1939 during early planning meetings and lasted through to the 
1948 division of Germany. The equitable application of multilateralism as a basis for 
foreign policy determination was not initially accepted by other sectors of the U.S. 
Government; but over the course of this period State Department officials were able to 
overcome intergovernmental resistance. Motives for postwar planning for Germany were 
based on concerns over the growth of economic nationalism, which had led to a dramatic 
decrease in international commerce during the 1930s. This paper follows the web of 
multilateral foreign policy implementation as it weaves it way through the early planning 
process, interdepartmental disagreements, severe problems during the military 
occupation, and finally an impasse with the Soviets over occupied Germany.         
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Introduction 
 
 At the dawn of the twentieth century, Germany stood at the hub of a delicate 
commercial trade network that covered much of the world. World War One and, even 
more so, the Great Depression had shaken that structure until the final calamity struck in 
1939, leaving a world barren and defaced. The post-WWII effort to rebuild this 
multilateral trade network was spearheaded by the US State Department. Their effort was 
unique; it called for a concerted large-scale effort by a victorious United States to partner 
with its wartime allies and drastically expand the international trading system with the 
intent of creating prosperity for all. Even the defeated nations were to be included. In the 
past, military victories were usually followed by empire, imperialism, colonization, 
Balkanization, or retribution. US State Department officials planned for a different 
future; they believed that the reconstruction of the victorious nations could not be 
separated from reconstruction of their wartime enemies. National borders would be 
unable to restrain postwar reconstruction, and Germany and Japan would need to play a 
pivotal role in a world system of multilateral trade.  
 The peace and prosperity of the second half of the twentieth century were at stake, 
and the United States had no choice but to take a leading role. The 1945 to 1949 
occupation period was a difficult one, but by 1950, West Germany and Western Europe 
were well on the way to full economic recovery. The constructive achievement of this 
accomplishment had its foundation in the 1930s with a group of individuals centered at 
the US State Department, under the direction of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his 
chief economist, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky. They pursued an unyielding effort to use the power 
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of the US economy to construct a capitalist world economic system based on multilateral 
cooperation rather than economic nationalism. This paper demonstrates how by 1940 a 
resolute foreign policy consensus had developed at the US State Department and how 
officials sought to create a multilateral, free-market, free-trade scheme on an international 
stage. It was anticipated that this policy would eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring 
depression and foster prosperity for the United States and others during the postwar 
period. 
US occupation policy toward Germany was complex and unique. State 
Department officials who formulated policy for the German postwar period had to 
struggle with interdepartmental disagreements, make changes to resolve difficult 
circumstances in Europe, and react to perceptions of Soviet expansionism. However, 
from 1939–1949, this multilateral economic outlook was the keystone of US foreign 
policy. During negotiations for the occupation of Germany, this policy was pursued 
aggressively by State Department officials and eventually overcame challenging policy 
schemes from the Treasury, War, and Executive branches. State Department multilateral 
economic policy had far-reaching effects on the German occupation and was consistent 
with the long-term US State Department goal of creating a multilateral world of free–
markets and free–trade.  
The policy originating in 1939 by the early postwar planners at the US State 
Department rested on the principle of multilateral economic cooperation among nations. 
It was a single thread that led through a tangled web of US global strategy stretching 
from 1939 to 1948. Their concept was based on multilateral trade; that is, trade between 
groups of nations whose exports and imports are not in balance between two nations but 
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whose balance of payments will likely find equilibrium in regard to trade with all nations. 
This trade usually conforms to comparative advantages in which countries attempt to buy 
imports at the cheapest price and sell exports at a premium price.1 Over the course of the 
1939 to 1948 period, this multilateral concept became second nature among State 
Department officials, and eventually, the consensus of the US government and military 
establishment.2 By 1948, because of its powerful economic position, the United States 
had the ability to set many of the rules for the postwar international commercial system. 
Being in the position of an occupier of Germany, the United States was able to use the 
potentially strong German industrial economy as leverage in Europe, around which 
multilateral connections could be based.  
  Large financial interests in the United States started to recognize the importance 
of European-US economic interaction soon after WWI. Prosperity during the 1920s 
coincided with a redevelopment of US exports to Europe. Instability in Europe in the 
1930s coincided with the depression and a dramatic reduction in international commerce. 
The Dawes plan of 1924 was at its heart a concerted effort by a group of private US 
investors lead by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company to make capital available to 
Europe through loans to Germany, with the intention of invigorating international 
commerce.3 During the interwar period, leading capitalists on both sides of the Atlantic 
were troubled by each other’s actions. The development of National Socialism in 
Germany during the 1930s presented itself to financial elites in the United States as 
                                                 
1 David W. Pearce, ed., The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics: 4th Edition, fourth edition edition 
(Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1992), 292. 
2 Bruce Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations. 
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 1972, 1972), 227. 
3 Maurizio Vaudagna, The Role of the United States in the Reconstruction of Italy and West Germany, 
1943-1949: Papers Presented at a German-Italian Colloquium Held at the John F. Kennedy-Institut Für 
Nordamerikastudien, Berlin, June 1980, 8. 
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autarchic and ruthless. They believed that Nazism could not exist without a German 
industrial elite whose actions stoked the fires of fervent economic nationalism; this was a 
threat to the expansion of American free enterprise.4 The German Nazi party saw the 
United States, not the Soviets, as their chief long-term economic antagonist. They had 
little respect for the Soviets or the British as a world force and saw the eventual 
confrontation in terms of a German nationalist economy coming in opposition to a US-
lead world economy.5 The outbreak of war in 1939 preempted an international economic 
showdown between the German and US versions of international commerce. The ability 
of the US industrial economy to produce an unlimited volume of armaments to supply its 
WWII allies suggests that Hitler may have realized that he had better odds by striking 
quickly with his military on the European continent, rather than risking the eventuality of 
a long-term economic showdown with the United States on a worldwide stage.  
 
Historiography 
The historiography addressing postwar economic policy planning follows a 
multiple series of debates, the most prominent of which concerns the role of the United 
States in the economic recovery of Europe. When historians who write about this period 
are defined as traditional or revisionist, it often refers to their position on the contribution 
of the United States to the economic recovery of Europe. A traditional historian would 
assign a great deal of credit to the United States for European economic recovery. A 
revisionist would assign only a minimal benefit to the United States. This would also 
hold true for the recovery of Germany. A traditionalist would assign a great deal of value 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 39. 
5 Ibid., 69. 
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to the US occupation policy. For example, substantial credit would be given to the United 
States for limiting reparation payments from Germany, enacting currency reform, and 
integrating Germany into the European Recovery Program (ERP). There are a number of 
revisionists who give the United States modest credit for European recovery but, as a 
direct result of the occupation, give the United States considerable credit for West 
German recovery. 
A second major historiographical debate centers on the division of Germany into 
East and West. A traditional view would place the blame predominately on the Soviets; a 
revisionist would place a significant amount of blame on the United States. Other 
historical debates can be recognized. There is a difference of opinion as to whether US 
policy toward occupied Germany was driven by economic or political goals. There is also 
a debate as to whether or not the problems encountered in the immediate aftermath of the 
war were due to a US State Department preoccupation with long-term planning while 
overlooking the need for short-term planning.  
One of the best early accounts of US policy is Economic Planning for the Peace, 
written by E.F. Penrose in 1953. This study focuses on the 1940 to 1947 period, but 
Penrose does address US policy developments in the early 1950s. Penrose wrote his 
account as an insider; he worked with Dr. Isaiah Bowman on postwar planning until 1941 
when he was appointed economic advisor to John Gilbert Winant, the US Ambassador to 
the United Kingdom.6 Penrose is considered a traditionalist as he points to the ERP as 
being the boldest, most imaginative, and successful international policy measure ever 
taken by the United States. He described the conditions in Europe in 1947 as a crisis; this 
determination is a key factor in differentiating a traditionalist from a revisionist. Most 
                                                 
6 E. F. Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 8. 
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historians who wrote close to this period never questioned their assertion that 1947 was a 
year of crisis in Germany and Europe. By the 1980s, with the release of financial 
documentation from the period, revisionist historians who studied empirical data from the 
postwar period assert that 1947 was not a year of crisis. These historians point to 
economic data that shows a consistent recovery starting as early as 1945. To Penrose and 
other traditional historians, 1947 was undoubtedly a year of crisis; therefore, the recovery 
post-1947 constituted a dramatic improvement.7  
In his 1984 book, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, Allen S. 
Milward, a professor at the European University Institute in Florence, bases his argument 
on the conviction that 1947 was not a year of crisis. He acknowledges there were 
difficulties in 1947 but that they were just the result of economic growing pains. 
Milward, a leading revisionist, asserts that economic growth was well under way by 1947 
and that the ERP had no overall dramatic effect on European recovery. For Milward, the 
difficulties of 1947 arose because economic growth was too fast. European nations were 
suffering from a poor balance of payments, namely a dollar gap. This condition was 
caused by a Bretton Woods agreement that was not comprehensive enough to handle the 
postwar financial needs of Europe.8 Milward makes use of numerous charts, showing 
how nation-by-nation the upward growth curve of production was continuous from 1945 
on. This was true for every nation except Germany, whose recovery was taking place at a 
much slower pace. Milward identifies the German recovery as being different than others 
in Europe and lists the absence of Germany trade from the European economy as one of 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 352. 
8 Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 465. 
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the difficulties in 1947.9 Possibly the best response to Milward’s claim was made by 
William Diebold Jr. in his 1988 article “The Marshall Plan in Retrospect.” Diebold, a 
Director of Economic Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), points out that 
Milward’s assertion—that 1947 was not a crisis—is not credible because it goes against 
what everyone in Europe thought at the time.10 Perhaps the most abundant source for a 
traditional narrative that 1947 was a year of crisis comes directly from US State 
Department documentation. This primary source material continuously refers to 1947 as a 
year of crisis, and views the post-1947 recovery as dramatic. 
A third version of historical events can be seen in John H. Backer’s 1978 book, 
The Decision to Divide Germany. Backer served under General Clay in the economics 
section of the occupational government and went on to become Clay’s biographer. 
Backer sees himself as neither a traditionalist nor a revisionist. He claims there was no 
grand design pursued by the US State Department, nor did he see any evidence of a long 
range Soviet design for conquest. He suggests that the Soviets were exhausted, close to 
starvation, and in great need of assistance. For Backer, US foreign policy was decisive in 
Germany, but not in the form of a grand design. He saw policy development as 
incremental, small steps developed in real time to deal with the immediate situation at 
hand. He gives a detailed account of more than fifteen decisions, starting with the 
weakening of the Allied Control Council (ACC) in 1945 to the currency reform of 1948, 
all leading eventually to the division of Germany.11 This version directly challenges an 
earlier book written by Bruce Kuklick in 1972 titled American Policy and the Division of 
                                                 
9 William Diebold Jr., “The Marshall Plan in Retrospect: A Review of Recent Scholarship,” Journal of 
International Affairs 41, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 430. 
10 Ibid., 431. 
11 John H Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany: American Foreign Policy in Transition (Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978), 173. 
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Germany. A professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Kuklick espoused a thesis 
similar to the argument that I make in this paper, namely that there was a multilateral 
consensus—a grand design—that was economic in nature and became second nature to 
diplomats at the State Department. Kuklick asserts that the American commitment to 
multilateralism demanded free markets and an aggressive economic stance. This ideology 
became central to US policy in occupied Germany and was directly responsible for the 
development of US-Soviet antagonisms. The United States was unwilling to concede to 
reparations and other economic issues because of its commitment to multilateralism, and 
it was this firm stance that lead to the division of Germany and, ultimately, the Cold 
War.12 
Another significant contribution to this study was The West German Economy 
1945–1955 written in 1991 by Alan Kramer, a professor of European History at Trinity 
College in Dublin. Kramer discounts the value of the ERP for the economic revival of 
Germany. His main argument is that Germany was poised to expand rapidly as soon as 
world trade revived. Allied bombing did not shatter the West German industrial 
economy. Economic recovery began in 1945 and developed as part of a European trade 
bloc, not an American style multilateral world system.13 This is a similar position to what 
was taken by Milward; the resumption of trade for Germany came about as a result of a 
German-French connection combining to form an interdependent European system. 
German reentry into the West European economy had to wait until it became acceptable 
to the Europeans and was not the result of US foreign policy.14 Kramer and Milward both 
maintain that the difficulty the United States had in reaching a mutual agreement with 
                                                 
12 Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 6. 
13 Alan Kramer, West German Economy, 1945-1955, First Edition (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1991), 226. 
14 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 491. 
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European nations on ERP policy revealed how far apart the economic objectives of the 
separate nations were and that the redevelopment of European postwar trade favored the 
nationalistic interest of each separate nation, not an integrated mutual benefit to the 
group. Revisionist historians do give the ERP some credit for helping West Germany 
return to the European market. Postwar West Germany, unlike other ERP participants, 
was in no position to object to interference by the United States in its national 
sovereignty, and at the time, was in critical need of US funding for import materials. Both 
Milward and Kramer acknowledge that the ERP had a positive effect on the return of 
commercial trade to Germany, and because of its weakened condition it was more than 
willing to receive aid.15 
The debate over the effects of short-term policy versus long-policy on the 
restoration of the German economy has been the cause of another rift amongst historians. 
Penrose blames the problems faced in Germany from 1945 to 1947 on the failure by the 
United States to develop an effective short-term policy. Preparation of long-term policy 
by the US State Department was well conceived and would have prevented the economic 
disaster of the interwar period in a reconstructed world. Penrose maintains that because 
Germany was in such a weak position in 1945, the long-term multilateral free trade 
policy pursuit of the US State Department was unrealistic. The economic errors of 
postwar planning were the omissions of preparation for short-term emergencies that arose 
in the immediate aftermath of the war. Penrose puts most of the blame for this omission 
on the interference of the Treasury Department in 1944.16 This position is similar to the 
position held by Backer, and would seem to hold a significant amount of weight as both 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 471. 
16 Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, 360. 
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Penrose and Backer were in Europe at the time working on this problem. Penrose did see 
a value in the long-term planning done by the State Department, whereas Backer believed 
that the most important policy decisions were made at lower levels and prompted by 
immediate necessity. Backer saw little value in the long-term planning made by the US 
State Department for the German recovery.17  
The main argument of this thesis is that the motivation behind State Department 
policy towards Germany was primarily economic with political motivations becoming 
secondary. Kuklick says something very similar. He frames the US commitment to 
economic multilateralism in an ideology that would serve the interests of the United 
States and all other nations. Multilateralism developed around a consensus that a 
country’s economic institutions determine both its political institutions and the 
psychology of its citizens.18 This stands in contrast to how Milward describes the 
motivation behind State Department policy. Milward states that US policy was 
formulated primarily for political objectives and only used economic policy as a 
mechanism.19 Milward saw the aim of the ERP to create a political institution, the United 
States of Europe. It seems to me that Kuklick’s argument is closer to the truth. Milward 
bases his ideas about US motivations on empirical data from European sources and 
comes to a conclusion about US State Department motives that is not substantiated by 
State Department documentation. Officials at the State Department talked to a certain 
extent about a politically integrated United Europe, but the overwhelming evidence from 
US State Department documents seems to point to a US foreign policy consensus that 
                                                 
17 Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, IX. 
18 Kuklick, American Policy and the Division of Germany; the Clash with Russia over Reparations., 3. 
19 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, 5. 
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was determined to rebuild a European commercial system by using economic policy to 
create economic results with political benefits coming as a byproduct. 
Historians like Bruce Kuklick, by advancing a theory that events like the division 
of Germany and the start of the Cold War were caused by a US foreign policy based on a 
firm belief in multilateralism, are considered part of a more extreme branch of the 
revisionist school.20 It essentially suggests that Western economic theory favors 
multilateralism and that US State Departments motivations were driven by a belief that a 
worldwide system of trade would benefit everyone involved. Evidence of this can be seen 
in the willingness of early postwar planners to include everyone, including the Soviets, in 
its commercial trade plans. It was not until 1947 when the Soviets rejected 
multilateralism that political divisions were established. I do not completely agree with 
Kuklick, who seems to think that multilateralism was universally accepted by all US 
government agencies from the start. Kuklick maintains that Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Morgenthau Jr., by promoting the Morgenthau Plan for the harsh treatment of 
Germany, was advancing a multilateral policy. Morgenthau believed that depressing the 
German economy would enhance British foreign trade. This may have been what 
Morgenthau believed, but it is not multilateralism. This thesis argues that the Treasury 
Department did not promote multilateralism. Their attempt to promote harsh treatment 
for Germany and advance an inadequate Bretton Woods Agreement were weak attempts 
to repair the conditions of the interwar period, not drive the postwar world toward an 
expanded prosperity. Kuklick seems to apply multilateralism broadly to all US 
government departments. This thesis presents a distinction, multilateralism was a policy 
first developed at the State Department that had to overcome opposition from the 
                                                 
20 Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany, 174. 
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Treasury Departments and other branches of the US government before it later became 
accepted as a consensus by most US government agencies. 
Primary Sources 
The primary documentation for this paper comes from the Foreign Relations of 
the United States Collection (FRUS), published by the US State Department. The original 
State Department documentation has been digitized and is available at the University of 
Wisconsin Digital Collections center. It consists of official documentation of all major 
foreign policy decisions that have been declassified for publication. The FRUS collection 
begins in 1861 with the Lincoln administration and runs through 1960. Produced by the 
US State Department Office of the Historian, it includes documents from various 
Presidential libraries, internal memoranda, documents from the State and War (Defense) 
Departments, and private papers from those involved in the creation of foreign policy. 
The framework for this paper was built around FRUS documentation from 1939 to 1948 
relevant to the development and implementation of postwar economic policy toward 
Germany. Also included as primary source materials were speeches and publications 
from US government economists and diplomatic officials involved in the creation of 
policy toward postwar Germany. Finally, official publications from the Council of 
Foreign Relations and its members from 1939–1942 were included as essential parts of 
the first half of this paper. Throughout the ten years covered by this paper, there was a 
substantial turnover of department officials whose input affected policy decisions. For 
example, starting in 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his staff were at the center 
of policy development; Hull was then succeeded by Edward Stettinius Jr., James F. 
Burns, and George C. Marshall, respectively. In general, the group of State Department 
                                                                                                                                  
  
13
 
officials in charge of policy in 1948 was a completely different group than those who 
started the process in 1939. 
Chapter Summaries and Related Secondary Sources 
Chapter I, 1939: An Assessment of Risk and Opportunity, offers an assessment of 
the world economic situation as WWII approaches. Discussion focuses on the breakdown 
of the international trade by the introduction of trade restrictions and the growth of 
economic nationalism. Prewar economic warfare on the European continent is discussed 
as an unavoidable reaction by totalitarian leaders to US trade policy, including Hitler’s 
seemingly sensible economic approach to rebuild German international commerce. US 
documentation shows concerns about the development of Germany’s postwar plan for 
“New Order” in a Nazi dominated Europe, a nationalist system of international 
commerce at odds with US commercial interest. Authors like Vera Micheles Dean and 
Paul Enzig add to the narrative about the development of German economic nationalism. 
Starting in 1939, early postwar planners at the US State Department studied how the 
United States would have to react to the economic challenges of a European economy 
controlled from Berlin. As the military situation on the European continent changed, the 
US State Department had to also change policy formation and consider the implications 
and opportunities of an Allied victory. The State Department turned to a group of 
advisors who developed a unique plan based on a set of core economic principles 
designed to reassemble international trade to eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring 
depression. 
Chapter II, 1939–1944: Early Postwar Planning, describes how two agencies—
one governmental, the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies, and one private, 
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the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)—linked together to formulate postwar policy. 
They agreed on a strategy and a purpose that was driven by economic prosperity for all, 
including the defeated Germans. Three State Department policy papers are examined in 
detail: Percy W. Bidwell authors a proposal for postwar German commercial policy, 
Arthur Gayer and Alvin Hansen author a proposal for industrial cartels, and Diebold 
offers a proposal for postwar reparations. Although a general consensus was reached, the 
committee members were not in complete agreement. Isaiah Bowman and Sumner 
Welles, two influential committee members, came close to splitting the committee over 
proposals concerning the postwar division of Germany. Starting in August of 1944 the 
policy recommendations advanced by the postwar planners at the State Department was 
beginning to run into substantial resistance from officials at the US Treasury Department. 
Chapter III, 1944–1945: Interdepartmental Struggle, covers intervention by the 
Treasury Department and the Executive Branch in State Department planning. 1944 was 
the start of a five-year campaign by the State Department to implement its multilateral 
free trade policy as the dominant feature of postwar Germany economic framework. This 
chapter looks at the development of a rivalry between State and Treasury over the general 
direction of postwar global commercial policy and examines how this would affect 
Germany. Harry Dexter White, a senior official at the Treasury Department 
recommended a twofold postwar policy agenda, a punitive approach to postwar 
Germany, and a commercial policy that was aimed at fixing the problems of the interwar 
commercial trading system. Meanwhile, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky and his colleagues at the 
State Department developed a more dynamic proposal to infuse the postwar world with 
an expansive prosperity that was to include Germany. The end result was a policy victory 
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for the Treasury Department, putting the State Department at a severe disadvantage at the 
start of the occupation. After losing this interdepartmental struggle, the effort to 
implement the vision of early postwar planners would be passed to a new group of State 
Department officials who kept the dreams of a prosperous multilateral world alive. 
Chapter IV, 1945–1948: The Occupation Period, covers the occupation period 
immediately after the war and examines how policy evolved from a punitive JCS1067 
directive issued in 1945 to a policy that by 1947 was promoting German prosperity. An 
important focus of this chapter is the misguided policy planning by all agencies of the US 
government in dealing with the realities of a postwar occupation. During this period, the 
State Department had to work closely with the occupation officials at the War 
Department, most notably, General Lucius Clay, head of US occupation forces. Clay’s 
writings and military publications are examined, as they deal with a deteriorating 
situation. 
Chapter V, 1947–1948: An Integrated West Germany, looks at how the 
commitment of the US State Department to a multilateral economy recovery affected the 
division of Germany and its return to prosperity. By 1947, the US State department was 
returning to a position of power in the development of occupation policy. The situation in 
Germany was becoming desperate and it appeared there was no good solution. There was 
little policy cooperation between the United Sates and the Soviets, and negotiations 
concerning economic and national unity issues were going nowhere. This chapter draws 
heavily on State Department documentation from the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) headed 
by George Kennan. The European Recovery Plan (ERP) developed under the direction of 
Kennan, became the State Department recipe for problems in Germany and Europe. After 
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it was unable to resolve the problem of German reunification with the Soviets, the US 
State Department turned to an aggressive economic policy, using ERP funding to set up a 
multilateral commercial system in the non-Soviet controlled portion of Europe. 
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Chapter I  
1939: An Assessment of Risk and Opportunity 
The Growth of Economic Nationalism 
          The Great Depression of 1929 was a key turning point for the twentieth century. 
Economic insecurity during the interwar period was the result of escalating 
unemployment, increasing amounts of international debt, and insurmountable tariff 
barriers. The onset of the Great Depression not only reversed any positive aspects of the 
1920s, but also severely compounded ominous trends that were developing in 
international commerce. As a result of this instability, significant counter forces took root 
at this time the revolutionary outlook of communism—a general contempt for the 
precepts of Christianity—and the failure of democracy to contend with economic distress. 
Loyalty and unity among nation-states were becoming progressively degraded.1 The 
United States and other major powers routinely practiced nationalistic economic policies 
while international loans and increasing tariff barriers had suicidal effects on 
international commerce. Commercial trade among nations was drastically reduced to 
levels far below pre-WWI totals.2 As this trend continued, nations increasingly turned to 
extreme nationalism.  
                                                 
1 Harley A. Notter, United States, and Department of State., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-
1945, Department of State Publication; 3580. General Foreign Policy Series; 15. (Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print Off., 1949), 8. 
2 Ibid., 9. 
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By 1933, the international system of trade and finance was crippled. Europe was 
in significant international debt and no positive steps were being taken to remedy the 
situation. Astronomical sums were being assessed on WWI reparation accounts. Even if a 
robust amount of international trade had existed, it still would have taken a massive effort 
to liquidate the magnitude of war debt and reparation payments that had accumulated. 
The situation was different for the United States than it was for Europe. As a creditor 
nation, the United States was able to provide large loans to foreign nations; this lending 
allowed the United States to maintain a high export level while restricting imports with 
the use of tariff barriers. Consequently, a significant portion of the United States lending 
to European nations was used to cover the debt owed.3 The continued lending from the 
United States only served to further destabilize the international commercial system.  
The interwar period was dominated by a steady growth of exaggerated 
protectionism. Because of the reduced volume of international commerce, debtor nations, 
like Germany, could not generate enough trade income from which to meet their 
obligations. Trade restrictive policies by creditor nations, like the United States, 
perpetuated this international imbalance.4 The United States assumed the responsibility 
for starting the process in 1922 with the enactment of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. By 
the mid-1920s, Europe, especially Germany, responded with its own protectionist tariffs. 
Then, in 1930, the United States compounded trade obstacles with the Hawley-Smoot 
Tariff.5 Over the course of the interwar period, greater obstacles were being placed in the 
                                                 
3 Leo Pasvolsky, The Problem of Economic Peace after the War., [United States] Dept. of State. 
Publication,; 1720; Commercial Policy Series,; 72; (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1942), 10. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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way of imports. As a consequence, the total volume of international commerce was in 
steep decline, much lower before WWII than it was before WWI. 
International support for high tariff polices and poorly conceived international 
loans spread poverty and despair at a time when the world was looking to the United 
States leadership.6 Nations practiced economic discrimination with complete disregard 
for others. Foreign trade was considered a cutthroat game open for each nation to profit 
by taking advantage of its neighbor. In the US, an isolationist sentiment had taken control 
over national policy. The US contribution to these “beggar-thy-neighbor” polices caused 
lower living standards in nations around the world. American private investors 
perpetuated the problem by making irresponsible loans to debtor nations. During the 
1920s, the United States became the world’s largest creditor nation. Much of the money 
borrowed by nations was used to purchase US exports or to pay back loans owed to the 
US government. Loans made to Germany, in particular, were part of a circular scheme; 
borrowed money was being used by Germany to make reparation payments to US WWI 
allies who, in turn, would use the same money to make war debt repayments back to the 
United States. At the same time, these countries’ exports were being purged from the US 
market because of the US’ high tariff environment denying them much needed trade 
revenue.7 The international trade barrier problem was further compounded in 1932 by the 
introduction of the Ottawa agreements. British Commonwealth nations, as a reaction to 
US tariff policy, set up a zone of imperial trade preferences amongst themselves. 
International trade with Canada, Australia, India, South America, and other British 
Commonwealth nations was severely limited because of heightened trade barriers 
                                                 
6 Sumner Welles, Post-War Commercial Policy, Department of State. Publication ; No. 1660; Commercial 
Policy Series ; No. 71; (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1941), 3. 
7 Ibid. 
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established within the Commonwealth.8 In an era of deteriorating international 
cooperation, extremist nationalist political solutions were gaining popularity. Nations, 
like Germany, for which economic prowess should have been able to provide a stable and 
prosperous standard of living for its citizens were mired in economic distress. 
The growth of international commerce was also restrained during the interwar 
period by the expanded use of industrial cartels. Unlike in the United States where cartels 
were viewed with animosity, European nations increasingly developed cartel 
arrangements to gain control over targeted markets. The proliferation and popularity of 
industrial cartels was not limited to Germany. The division of world markets is always a 
critical element of any cartel agreement; the goal of an arrangement is to eliminate import 
competition and to inhibit the growth of domestic industries. For example, in February 
1939, at a meeting in Düsseldorf, Germany, the Federation of British Industries arranged 
with the German Reichsgruppe Industrie to divide Latin American markets in a 
coordinated effort to drive out other exporters. Also, during the 1930s, IG Farben and 
other British industries united to create dumping zones in South America to drive out 
other importers and eliminate domestic competition.9 European industrial cartel policy 
threatened US export industries and prevented the growth of domestic industries in Latin 
America. By the late 1930s, the tide of economic nationalism was overtaking any 
pragmatic approach to the liberalization of international commercial policy as European 
nations increasingly turned to cartel arrangements. 
In this tragic era, the most significant effort to reverse the fatal protectionist trend 
was started in 1932 by the new US Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Secretary Hull, from 
                                                 
8 Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, 21. 
9 Council on Foreign Relations, Postwar Controls of the German Economy, ed. Percy Wells Bidwell, 
American Interests in the War and the Peace (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1944), 11. 
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the beginning of his term, was an unwavering free trader. With the support of the 
Roosevelt administration, Secretary Hull actively sought to reduce US tariff barriers. His 
method involved bypassing the need for Senate ratification by making use of bilateral 
agreements with multiple nations.10 With the implementation of reciprocal trade 
agreements negotiated by the executive branch, he started the process of reducing tariffs, 
quotas, and import restrictions. Basing US policy on the widest application of “most-
favored-nation” status, he sought to eliminate discriminatory commercial trade policy.11 
Secretary Hull’s effort to expand international commerce was in jeopardy throughout the 
1930s as other nations increasingly continued their move toward extreme protectionist 
economies. 
German Policy and Economic War 
By the late 1930s, international commerce had moved beyond beggar-thy-
neighbor protectionism to a state of economic totalitarianism. The United States had to 
adapt to an international atmosphere that to a great extent had become outside of its 
reach. Terms, such as economic warfare, autarky, and economic totalitarianism, were 
being used to describe the policy pursuits of Germany and its allies. These designations 
communicated a hyper-aggressive form of commercial policy that became detrimental to 
human welfare.12 The obstruction of international trade by excessive barriers served to 
fortify German prosperity into a self-defined zone. By rigid regimentation of the trade 
process, drastic selection of imports, and aggressive policies toward weaker countries, 
Germany made the substantially reduced volume of international commerce serve the 
                                                 
10 Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, 22. 
11 Pasvolsky, The Problem of Economic Peace after the War., 16. 
12 Ibid., 4. 
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needs of its rearmament program.13 The economic autarchy practiced by Germany at this 
time bred international conflict, animosity, and ill will. 
Autarchy found its roots in the distinction between national economies and world 
economies. Various historians, commentators, and economists have sought to rationalize 
Germany’s aggressive economic policies by claiming that the German system, based on 
autarchy, developed a distinctive set of characteristics of its own that differed from that 
of US and other Western capitalist systems. In his book Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe, 
Paul Einzig contended that German commercial policy differed from other Western 
nations because the common notion of an international division of labor was never 
popular in Germany. Much of German economic thought developed as an antithesis to 
Adam Smith-type laissez-faire principles. For Germany, the concept of an international 
division of labor enabling a free and open international exchange conflicted with 
tendencies toward a German “national system.”14 In the nineteenth century, German 
economist Friedrich List developed an economic theory involving a national system that 
opposed absolute free trade, which meant that every country should produce at home all 
of the goods necessary for its national security. Since the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century, German statesmen had practiced List’s doctrine; a number of 
economically unjustifiable industries were developed for purely military considerations.15 
Since the advent of the Nazi regime in 1933, the German national system of autarchy and 
economic warfare had been executed to an extreme.  
                                                 
13 Leo Pasvolsky, The United States in the World Economy, 1940 Some Aspects of Our Foreign Economic 
Policy, Department of State. Publication,; No. 1595; Commercial Policy Series,; (Washington, U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off., 1941), 22. 
14 Paul Einzig, Hitler’s “New Order” in Europe. (London, Macmillan, 1941), 102. 
15 Ibid., 104. 
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Although Germany had achieved technical maturity, some question if it had 
achieved political and social maturity. In his book The Struggle for World Order, 
Micheles Dean argued that because the Germans, unlike the French and English, had 
failed to achieve national unity until relatively recently, they remained outside the 
mainstream of Western social and political development. In the 1930s, Germany had the 
outward appearance of a modern state with up-to-date industrial techniques, but it really 
belonged to a different formation than that of Western Europe. Politically, Germany was 
still living in the sixteenth century. Germany, because of its belated union, failed to share 
in the social and political developments that formed the Western European tradition.16 
Because of this lack of social and political development, Germany was unable properly 
integrate in the Western world economy. 
Some historians identified certain groups like industrial leaders or the Junkers for 
the creation of German nationalist polices. In his article “Postwar Controls of the German 
Economy,” Percy W. Bidwell, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assigned a 
considerable amount of responsibility for Germany’s aggressive economic policy to the 
Junker class. Bidwell acknowledged that it would be an obvious overstatement to assign 
the Junker class sole responsibility for economic warfare; however, the Junkers, together 
with their industrial counterparts, were largely responsible for Germany’s high protective 
trade policy since 1879.17 
The best way to clarify the motivations that drove European economic 
nationalism is to look at the statements made by the European heads of state. In February 
1940, President Roosevelt sent Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Europe on a 
                                                 
16 Vera Micheles Dean and Foreign Policy Association, The Struggle for World Order, Headline Books, no. 
32 (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1941), 12. 
17 Council on Foreign Relations, Postwar Controls of the German Economy, 22. 
                                                                                                                                  
  
24
 
fact-finding mission. Welles was assigned to meet with German, Italian, and other 
European leaders to ascertain if grounds for a peaceful settlement existed. Two important 
topics of discussion were that of international commercial policy and the Roosevelt 
administration’s attempt to lower world trade barriers.  
Statements made by Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Mussolini put into perspective the 
economic environment of the time. Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, and German Foreign 
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop made it clear in discussions with Welles that they 
blamed both the United States and Great Britain for starting a tariff war. As Mussolini 
expressed, there was no greater discrimination policy than what was found in the Ottawa 
Agreements or the tariff policy pursued by the United States before the start of the 
Roosevelt Administration. Mussolini further stated that Italy was the last major country 
to enter into an autarchic system and did so solely as a last resort. Italian policy was 
developed as a self–defense mechanism after being confronted by large trade obstructions 
established by the United States and Great Britain.18 The Italian leader unmistakably 
described the United States as the first aggressor against the freedom of international 
commerce. 
Welles’s then visited Germany to meet with Hitler’s inner circle to discuss 
international commerce, among other things. At this time, Nazi Germany was not overly 
concerned about the development of trade on a global scale, but it did aggressively 
pursue strict control over its European market. Hitler had a different perspective than 
Mussolini; he explained to Welles that unrestricted international trade was not the cure 
for the world’s economic problems. Because of the industrial nature of both the US and 
                                                 
18 United States Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940. 
General,” 1940, 31, http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS. 
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German productions, it would be better for Germany to intensify its trade relations with 
countries in Central and Southeastern Europe. 19 Hitler stipulated that Germany would 
benefit more from increased trade within the European continent because its immediate 
neighbors had a greater need for German industrial products than the United States. 
Welles countered Hitler’s argument by pointing out that the standard of living was too 
low in Southeastern Europe to make German industrial trade profitable. Industrial trade 
between Germany and the United States would be more advantageous for both parties.20 
This argument did not impress German leadership; they believed that challenging the 
United States at this time on a global level would not have been productive. 
Consolidation of their position in Europe would be the best policy for Germany interests. 
In a private conversation with Ribbentrop, Welles took the opportunity to outline 
the current US position on international commercial policy as developed by Secretary 
Hull. Welles explained that so long as Germany pursued its present autarchic policy and 
made use of every form of tariff discrimination, there would be no opportunity for the 
United States to improve relations with Germany.21 The development of a sound liberal 
trade policy was the only way for the world to retreat from economic warfare and return 
to a state of economic recovery.22 
By 1939, the military buildup had completely changed the nature of German 
commercial policy. Trade regimentation and narrow bilateralism was implemented not 
for economic reasons but for the purpose of rearmament. Market forces did not drive 
German import decisions. The purpose of Germany’s highly selective trade process was 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 68. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 40. 
22 Ibid., 118. 
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to maximize importation of the materials needed for armaments.23 This policy would be 
unsustainable over a long period without some type of forceful action on Germany’s part. 
As Germany’s demands for resources from its European neighbors grew so did their 
resentment. To pay for the large amounts of imported raw material and equipment, 
Germany used a type of enforced credit designation—a system of blocked marks that 
represented enforced loans to Germany by the countries from which it made its 
purchases. As time passed, Germany began to encounter greater difficulties in the 
operation of its trading system. Its trading partners became increasingly resistant to 
German policy of enforced credit and the large amounts of commodities it required.24 As 
more time passed, Germany needed to be even more forceful in its dealing with its 
neighbors. 
As the 1930s were coming to an end, Germany’s trade policy was drastically 
unstable. Germany had trouble reaching its desired trade levels, exporting only about half 
of what it had ten years earlier. In 1938, Germany’s export level was only 59% of its 
1929 level, whereas Great Britain’s exports had reached 74% of its 1929 level, and the 
US reached 79% of its 1929 export level. Germany’s international trade system was 
becoming unsustainable. The long-term result of this policy was the requirement of 
increasing the use of coercion with its trading neighbors to gain the resources it desired. 
Thanks to the Anschluss and Hitler’s raiding of Austrian gold and foreign reserves in the 
Austrian National bank, Germany was able to get thru 1938 by ruining a 450 million 
Reichsmark trade defect.25 This was only a temporary fix, as by 1939 Germany was back 
                                                 
23 Pasvolsky, The Problem of Economic Peace after the War., 13. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy / Adam Tooze. 
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to running balance of payments deficits. This problem was highlighted by Hitler’s 
announcement in 1938 that “Germany must either export or die.”26 As Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, 
Special Assistant to Secretary of State Hull, explained in his 1942 US State Department 
publication “The Problem of Economic Peace after the War,” whether German leaders 
looked at their commercial policy in the 1930s as being permanent was debatable, but it 
was clear that Germany’s trade policy had a powerful impact on the disruption of 
European trade relations.27 It seemed that in 1939, war had arrived just in time to save 
Germany’s economy from this critical trade imbalance. 
In addition to an aggressive trade policy, Germany also promoted a strong 
international cartel arrangement that aggravated and prolonged international commercial 
relations. Industrial cartels caused dangerous security and political consequences by 
promoting the power of the German state. By controlling large portions of regional 
markets, German cartels raised prices at will, restricted output, and kept out newcomers.28 
German industrial cartels raised the price of coal, steel, and cement while the economy 
was experiencing a recession. For example, in 1929, the price levels in markets controlled 
by cartels was 94% of 1926 levels, while the price levels in markets free from cartels 
were 61% of the 1926 levels.29 German cartels also over-reserved its share of critical 
products, like coal and steel, allowing Germany to become artificially self-sufficient.30 
The exclusive domination of German industrial cartels over markets contributed to 
poverty and increased economic tension in the region it controlled. 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 15. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Council on Foreign Relations, Postwar Controls of the German Economy, 7. 
29 Ibid., 3. 
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The Economic Consequences of a German Victory 
          In the lead up to war, American policy planners were concerned that a German 
victory in Europe would have dire consequences for the future of US economic 
prosperity. Without an efficient and open international division of labor, there could be 
no hope of avoiding the financial ruin of the Great Depression. Economists from both 
sides of the developing conflict understood that to promote prosperity and to raise the 
standard of living for their citizens, nations had to look beyond their borders to expand 
trade. In considering the postwar possibilities, by 1939, US State Department officials 
realized that Germany was eager to undertake the reorganization of European trade on 
their terms.31 The question in 1939 was whether the future process of organizing Europe 
into an efficient economic system would be done by the imposition of the German pattern 
or a more inclusive version sought by Western democratic powers.32 
How commercial policy was to be arranged in the post-WWII period depended on 
the outcome of the war. Planners at the State Department considered whether a German 
victory would dictate a continuation of pre-war heavy trade restrictions. They questioned 
if Germany would retain its recent policy of aggressive self-sufficiency or eventually 
return to balanced economic relationships. Early overwhelming victories of the 
Wehrmacht in Western Europe required them to consider the consequences of a 
permanent system of economic autarchy across the European continent.33 Most believed a 
German-controlled Europe would likely result in a highly-centralized trade scheme with 
Berlin as its focal point. In this case, the overall level of foreign commerce for the United 
                                                 
31 Dean and Foreign Policy Association, The Struggle for World Order, 12. 
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States would likely decline and the United States might eventually have to adopt 
German-type trading methods.34 The State Department planners started to look at other 
regions around the world to fill in a perceived US trade gap. 
Analysis done on the basis of a German victory showed that a future US 
economic trading bloc would be forcefully separated from European commerce. State 
Department analysts determined that a European Bloc controlled from Berlin would be 
more prosperous and self-sufficient than a US Bloc comprised solely of the Western 
Hemisphere. The United States without Europe would, at a minimum, have to integrate 
considerable sections of the British Empire or Asia to maintain prosperity.35 The State 
Department was unable to take any regions for granted, even the British Commonwealth. 
As late as 1940, powerful elements in the British financial and industrial sectors believed 
that the domination of Europe by Nazi Germany and the existence of the British 
Commonwealth were not necessarily contradictory.36 State Department planners were 
also particularly anxious about the possibility of German interference in the Western 
Hemisphere.  
In 1940, the capitulation of the Netherlands and the French request for an 
armistice sparked US concerns about the possibility of German influence in Latin 
America, specifically that European countries with possessions in the Caribbean would 
have their territories transferred to Germany. The United States was also concerned that 
some Latin American countries would become politically dependent on Germany. In June 
1940, the United States notified Germany through its diplomats in Rome and Berlin that 
                                                 
34 Pasvolsky, The United States in the World Economy, 1940 Some Aspects of Our Foreign Economic 
Policy, 25. 
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it would not accept the transfer of these territories to German control. State Department 
officials were disturbed by a threatening and contentious German response.37 Although 
Germany made it clear that they would not be intimidated by US concerns, for the 
moment they were focused on Europe.  
Hitler compared Germany’s position in Europe to the US position in the Western 
Hemisphere. For the time being German economic interests would be best suited not by 
unrestricted international trade but by taking up trade with its Eastern and Southern 
neighbors.38 As a great industrial power, Germany was entitled to safeguard its interest. 
Just as Latin America, quite legitimately, assured the position of the United States as a 
world power, Germany was also entitled to its sphere of influence and controlling 
position in Central Europe.39  
A main economic objective of a victorious Germany in a postwar Europe was to 
gain control over the heavy industries of the nations it occupied, putting German 
monopolist’s influence at the head of the European economy. With German management 
skill running the day-to-day operations, heavy industry would be the cornerstone of 
fascist occupation policy. The Krupp firm would run the European coal and iron 
industries under the direction of Herman Goring, the Flick firm under the direction of 
Heinrich Himmler would operate the steel industry, and the Schmitz firm under the 
direction of Joseph Goebbels would run the European chemical industry.40 State 
                                                 
37 Notter, United States, and Department of State., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945., 1949, 
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Department planners understood that the implications of a German controlled European 
economy meant little opportunity for US interests.  
American policymakers assumed that German postwar occupation economies 
would be guided by the following five principles: (1) to take over the heavy industries in 
occupied countries and put them under the control of German industrial cartels; (2) to 
eliminate domestic consumption manufacturing or any local industry that would compete 
with German firms; (3) to reorient new economies in occupied countries to 
predominantly agricultural production with a close tie to the German chemical fertilizer 
industry; (4) to develop the overall European financial policy to exclusively promote 
heavy industry and to cut financing to local consumer industrial manufactures; and (5) to 
limit the availability of capital, labor, and raw materials to local small businesses, 
shopkeepers, and independent craftsman.41 Germany would dismantle most industries in 
conquered areas and transfer their work to the Reich, eventually creating a Germany as a 
super-industrialized workshop supported by an agriculturalized Europe.42 Germany felt 
that it could sell this scheme to the European public as a new era of prosperity that would 
put an end to the deprivation of the 1930s. 
As war started to rage across the continent both the United States and Germany 
began to develop plans for how Europe should be organized after the war. Both sides had 
their own visions for the postwar period. In 1940, Germany proclaimed a “New Order” 
for Europe by declaring that nations under German control would enjoy unprecedented 
prosperity and an increase in the standard of living. Berlin promised that once British 
resistance was overcome, there would be a new golden age for Europe. A reduction of 
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personal freedoms in the occupied countries would be exchanged for a political and 
economic stability.43 Nazi propaganda for the New Order promised the people of Europe 
a comprehensive plan for recovery and expansion. Centralized economic planning and 
finance would be extended over an entire German-controlled Europe. An expansionary 
monetary policy with all non-German currencies stabilized and set in relation to the 
Reichsmark, tied to a gold benchmark or to the dollar. Unemployment would cease to 
exist by use of a continental-wide division of labor. There would be an extensive 
rationalization on a continental scale under the direction of German cartels. Germany 
would maintain a stable price level for agricultural production in Europe by fixing 
commodity prices for long periods of time. All trade agreements would be negotiated 
between continents with Europe operating as a unitary trade bloc. Finally, Europe would 
internally become a free trade zone.44 The specific plan envisioned by Germany fit the 
view of international commercial policy as explained by Hitler and Ribbentrop. 
German economists had a different outlook on the international division of labor 
than that of US economists. A German run division of labor on the continent of Europe 
would be focused on German nationalist goals. Production would only be allowed if it 
would result in a higher return for German industrial interests.45 Central planners in 
Berlin would pursue German interest over those of its vassal states. Although German 
propaganda claimed Europe would be a free trade zone, exports from occupied nations 
would only be allowed if they did not compete with German industry.46 At times, vassal 
states would be required to over-export to third party nation simply for Germany to get a 
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quantity of a particular foreign exchange currency of which it was short. An international 
division of labor did exist, but rather than operating for the needs of the market, it 
operated for the needs of a German military industrial structure.  
In early 1940, the German plan for “international commerce” in the immediate 
aftermath of WWII was not yet completely agreed on by the Nazi leadership. But a main 
objective included a system set up under a regional organization. The world would be 
composed of continental economic systems divided by regions. British and American 
financial interests would be excluded from the European continent. Europe would be 
controlled by Germany, Africa split between German and Italian interests, and Asia 
controlled by Japan. Russia and the Western Hemisphere would be left alone at this time. 
The main objective was the creation of “Grossraumwirtschaft,” a European economy in 
which Western financial interests would be excluded, while the flow of production would 
be directed toward Germany.47 This was drastically different than the multilateral system 
proposed by US planners in which the entire world would have equal access to markets 
and resources. 
The June 1941 invasion of Russia by Germany started to change the outlook of 
US postwar planners about the prospect of a German victory. By 1942, State Department 
planners started to believe that a German defeat was inevitable. This initiated both a 
change in the direction and an intensification of planning. The long-term goal of a 
multilateral world now started to seem like a definite possibility.48 A critical point of this 
strategic change was the concept of unconditional surrender. Early in 1943, a decision 
was made that would have major implications for postwar planning. Both Churchill and 
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Roosevelt decided to accept nothing less than a policy of unconditional surrender.49 For 
many Allied officials, the concept of postwar “economic security” became dependent on 
Germany’s total capitulation.50 The German menace must be wiped out permanently 
before the world can take a new contractual form.51 The Allied position seemed to 
solidify over the course of the war; it was anticipated that at war’s end Germany would 
not be in a position to refuse peace terms. The critical point was that there would be no 
bargaining and that postwar terms would be “imposed unilaterally” at the total discretion 
of the Allies.52 For the State Department, this was seen as a golden opportunity for the 
United States to take on global responsibility at the end of WWII that it had refused to 
accept after WWI. 
The Allied position of unconditional surrender was a goal that was targeted at the 
German leadership. At this early stage in the war, Roosevelt proclaimed that he felt no 
individual animosity toward the German and Italian people. However, he was intent on a 
complete change of their nationalistic systems. In August 1941, Welles quoted Roosevelt 
as stating that it was of great importance that a point of assurance must be given to the 
German and Italian peoples and that the British and the US governments desired to offer 
them fair and equal opportunity of economic character after the war.53 It is not clear 
whether this was just public posturing in the midst of war or if Roosevelt changed his 
mind as the war dragged on. It seems that near the end of the war Roosevelt was saying 
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something different, by 1945 he favored a policy that would teach all the German people 
a lesson.  
What Was at Stake for the Postwar Period? 
The US Department of State felt that the people of the United States and other 
nations must have a clear understanding of the stakes involved if the United States was to 
follow the techniques that would develop a strong economic peace in the postwar 
period.54 Wars are not fought for their own sake, but for the sake of determining which of 
the protagonists will shape the peace that follows.55 As for the United States, the world 
must be made aware that the United States is going to foster equality of economic 
opportunity for all nations. The cessation of armed hostilities will not be followed by a 
continuation of economic warfare on the basis of trade discrimination.  
Postwar planners were aware that the world was watching how the United States 
treated Germany. Men and women everywhere were searching for a new order. Their real 
task was to define the democratic concept of the postwar order in such a way as to 
convince people throughout the world, including the defeated nations, that a victory by 
Western powers was their best chance for a period of economic prosperity and 
reinvigorated democracy. It would be disastrous for the world if Europe returned to an 
acute form of nationalism. US planners understood that at the end of the war that Britain 
would not command the world influence it did in 1939, that France could not recapture a 
position of European leadership, and that Russia could no longer be ostracized by the 
world. The central question was the role of Germany and the pervasive feeling of most in 
the State Department that the United States had the power to ensure that Germany would 
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be an equal member of a multilateral world and not be reduced to a second rate nation, 
even temporarily.56   
State Department officials believed that comprehensive planning was necessary 
and that it must be done early. A delay in planning would allow special interest and 
pressure groups time to seek preferences for themselves and discrimination for others in 
the postwar economy.57 The period following the war was as decisive as the war itself. 
Allies could not pursue the same misguided policies of the past by waiting for a postwar 
summit to set policy; the disastrous consequences of the post WWI era was to be avoided. 
The State Department was committed to the notion that economic prosperity was the key 
requirement for the establishment of an enduring peace. Postwar planners approached the 
reconstruction of the world’s economy by taking into consideration the conditions that 
caused recent wars. Events of the previous decade led officials to devote their foremost 
attention to the relationship between foreign policy and economics. The coincidence of 
world depression with the rise of dictators appeared more than accidental. US State 
Department planners almost unanimously accepted the argument that economic distress 
was a major cause of WWII. Their direction of thinking was dominated by determining 
what measures could be undertaken to keep an economic depression from reoccurring.58 
As Secretary Hull proclaimed, “A world in economic chaos would be forever a breeding 
ground for trouble and war.”59 The State Department took this to heart and used this 
notion as a cornerstone from which to build policy.   
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By 1941, economists at the US State Department held firm in their position that it 
was harmful to return to an international economic system based on small national units 
struggling with each other for currency, raw materials, and markets, while striving to cut 
each other out. They understood that the beggar-thy-neighbor policy of the 1930s hurt 
everyone. US planners looked to the end of hostilities for the formation of larger 
economic units calling for a greater measure of cooperation in trade in order to forgo a 
resurgence of worldwide depression. A change of direction was required, creating larger 
integrated markets and not a system of direct totalitarian interference in economic 
affairs.60         
Planning for the postwar period became public on January 6, 1941 when President 
Roosevelt made his Four Freedoms speech. Even though classified planning had been 
underway at the State Department since 1939, it was this speech by Roosevelt that set the 
first public parameters for US postwar goals. President Roosevelt called for a world in 
which all people would share freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from 
want, and freedom from fear. From this date, human freedoms, including economic 
security, were publicly proclaimed as a fundamental cornerstone of US postwar 
planning.61 This speech significantly widened the basis for US foreign policy planning 
beyond what was previously discussed at State Department meetings.   
A State Department Consensus on How to Plan 
As WWII started in August 1939, Secretary Hull felt that all pre-1939 methods of 
preserving the peace were bankrupt; the United States had the ability and the burden to 
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correct the mistakes of the past. The strength of the United States would put it into a 
position to refute its internal isolationist sentiment and begin to take responsibility for 
world leadership in the postwar period.62 More than a responsibility, the current conflict 
presented itself to some US State Department officials as a grand opportunity for the 
United States to emerge as the premier power after the war. American interventionists at 
State were certain by 1939 that the conflict would involve the US and that prior 
preparation was vital not only for military preparedness but also for the broader terms of 
foreign policy.63 
Planning postwar policy involved more than just governmental agencies. Quasi-
governmental committees did much of the early planning. The Council on Foreign 
Relation (CFR) was the main non-governmental agency that worked to develop foreign 
policy and worked directly with the US State Department on many matters. The 
unofficial nature of the CFR was helpful to a Roosevelt administration that was reluctant, 
at this early stage, to publicly discuss its postwar planning objectives. A special type of 
institution like the CFR was critical to the validation of policy and to help develop a 
supportive public opinion. Despite a wide range of opinions and organizations actively 
commenting on policy at the time, the internationalist philosophy of the CFR best fit the 
views of the State Department. The CFR was helpful in developing the “correct” public 
opinion by direct contact between CFR sanctioned committees and the American 
public.64 The necessity for governmental secrecy had to be balanced with the need to 
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influence public opinion. Non-governmental agencies like the CFR were free to openly 
influence public opinion. 
The group officials working at the State Department were strong internationalists, 
overwhelmingly in favor of free trade and easing commercial restrictions. This directly 
contradicted the reality of world governance up to this time. In general, during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, national economies had been moving away from laissez-
faire capitalism and moving toward one form or anther of collectivism. Whether it was, 
New Deal programs in the United States, or totalitarianism in Germany, a wide range of 
national and international economic controls was increasingly focused on national 
economic development and forsaking international commercial relations.65 State 
Department officials were committed to change the situation by opening up international 
commerce in both the United States and abroad.  
Planning for the postwar period started in 1939 and was centered at both the US 
State Department and the CFR. A group of planners assembled under the direction of 
Secretary Hull who agreed in principle on a basic set of common beliefs. These beliefs 
were to have a significant impact on US foreign policy from this date forward. The 
change from an isolationist to an internationalist attitude of the US government policy 
after WWII can be traced to the early ideas and recommendations made by these CFR 
and State Department officials.        
One commonly-held belief was that planning should start early. US postwar 
planning was underway by the summer of 1939, more than two years before the United 
States went to war. The agenda was unfocused and leisurely, but it provided a solid basis 
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on which future relationships would build.66 Early planning was also kept confidential; 
the Roosevelt administration sought to develop political unity before the public 
discussion was started.67 There was still extensive isolationist resistance to US 
involvement in European affairs. There was concern on the part of the president that US 
public opinion would backfire against US involvement in a European war if postwar 
planning if it became public to early.68  
Another common belief among planners was that nations should strive to provide 
their citizens with a high standard of living in the postwar period. Despite the claims of 
superiority, neither German Fascism nor Soviet Communism was able to provide a higher 
standard living for their citizens.69 US planners placed great emphasis on a “social 
objective.” It was incumbent on governments everywhere, as expressed by Roosevelt’s 
Four Freedoms Speech, to create conditions of economic security and higher levels of 
individual well-being.70 In a speech delivered in 1942, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, proclaimed 
that once the earth is freed from the menace of these sinister forces, international 
relations will have to be organized in such a way as to ensure the economic and social 
welfare for individuals everywhere and to create international economic conditions that 
will make possible an efficient utilization of human and material resources of the world 
to maintain a measure of employment and rising standard of livings everywhere.71  
During WWII, there was a great increase in the role of economists and economic 
planning at the State Department. Officials thought that the US public was more likely to 
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support international economic collaboration than international political collaboration.72 
Starting in the 1930s, government officials had given extensive consideration to 
international economic policy and, from that time on, were focused on providing 
economics solutions to postwar problems.73 In 1942, Secretary Hull commented that the 
most important feature of postwar planning was to build sound international commerce.74 
Taking these considerations into account, early planning focused on developing a vibrant 
international commercial community as a cornerstone for an enduring peace. 
          State Department planners unanimously believed that the United States should 
occupy the dominant position in the postwar world. The United States would finally 
accept its global responsibility over matters vital to US security interests.75 Planners 
believed in an expanded geographic area of economic development, a “Grand Area” 
covering the Western Hemisphere, large portions of Europe, Asia, and include the 
defeated Axis powers of Germany and Japan.76                      
US planners believed that the United States would play the decisive role. A wide 
variety of officials believed that US foreign economic policy would be the crucial player 
in the postwar world.77 They believed that an increasing number of world leaders 
understood that the influence of the United States would be decisive after the war. The 
views of the United States on economic relations would have to be accepted by the rest of 
the world.78 
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The State Department reaffirmed US anti-cartel policy. Americans commonly 
believed that industrial cartels, monopolies, and trusts violated the public interest.79 
Postwar planners heartily agreed with American policy against this form of market 
control. A number of European countries did not possess a similar tradition against 
cartels; conversely, many countries, especially Germany, encouraged cartels. German 
firms like I.G. Farben, used cartels to further Nazi goals.80 State Department officials 
were determined that the defeat of the Nazi armies must be followed by the eradication of 
these weapons of economic warfare. German industrial cartels would have to be broken 
up and their political activities stopped. 
State Department planners also held a common view on repartitions. Both the 
United States and Great Britain were in favor of a smaller amount of reparation 
payments, whereas the French and Soviets were likely to ask for large reparation 
payments. US policy for post-WWII German reparation payments would need much 
consideration. The early leadership of the United States in formulating a reasonable 
settlement was critical.81 Developing a reparations figure by adding up the costs of 
restoring the wealth of all German victims would have led to an astronomical amount far 
in excess of Germany’s ability to pay. Because of this, the assessment of German 
reparation payments should not be a matter of justice and rights but one of economics and 
politics. Not only would Germany’s ability to pay have to be considered but also the 
effects of reparation payments on all sectors of the receiving country. As William 
Diebold, Jr., Research Secretary for the Council of Foreign Relations Economics Group, 
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agued in “What Shall Germany Pay,” it was in the long-run interests of the allied powers 
to preserve a valid economy in Germany. It was important that the United States develop 
a postwar position and that the position be wise and farsighted. Many countries, 
especially the USSR, would pursue heavy reparations.82 The United States and Great 
Britain would have to struggle to promote a moderate and practical reparations program 
for the good of international commerce. 
Building a Multilateral World 
The haunting specter of a reoccurring depression caused postwar planners to pay 
close attention to the critical relationship between international and domestic economics. 
A new global order based on economic integration was justified by the disastrous history 
of the 1920s and 1930s.83 Planners tied the prosperity of the American economy very 
closely to the outside world. They held a common conviction that a loss of large export 
markets would again cause a lowering of national income and a growth in unemployment 
as it had during the interwar period. 
The State Department envisaged a radical change in global international relations; 
their design emphasized an increase in prosperity by widespread use of multilateral trade. 
In a speech delivered in July 1940, Secretary Hull declared, “General postwar 
rehabilitation would depend on the revival of international commerce with liberal trade 
principles.”84 No nation can provide the necessities of modern life for its own people if it 
has access solely to its own resources. A group of nations cannot attain a high level of 
well-being in isolation. To be able to trade one nation’s surplus for the production of 
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another nation’s surplus does not necessarily mean unrestricted trade in the sense of an 
absence of any regulation, but expanding economic prosperity does require a large 
measure of flexibility in trade movement. International trade develops prosperity when it 
is multinational in nature.85 The creed of liberalized trade driven by multilateralism was 
to be a driving force in State Department policy and to have a deterministic effect of 
postwar occupation policy in Germany.   
With the end of WWII, a new opportunity presented itself. The State Department 
saw the collapse of Germany as a chance to implement its economic policy 
recommendations on an international scale. They were firm in their belief that it would 
eliminate the possibility of a reoccurring depression. They held their eyes firmly on 
postwar Germany as a unique proving ground for the planning in which they held so 
much faith. 
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Chapter II 
1939–1944: Early Postwar Planning  
Two Agencies Set the Agenda 
The US State Department and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) were the 
two major contributors to early planning for postwar Germany. Initial groundwork was 
started at the CFR with the blessing of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull.1 Their 
planning started in 1939, two years before the United States became involved in the war. 
By 1942, the planners at the CFR became officially integrated into the State Department. 
In 1944, other governmental departments became involved in postwar planning, but their 
work was done without regard for previously completed State Department proposals. 
Although officials within the State Department held a variety of ideas about the postwar 
occupation of Germany, there was a consensus on the main goal of global 
multilateralism.  
The CFR War and Peace Studies 
The CFR was founded in 1921 in New York as the nation’s leading foreign policy 
think tank; it stood at the apex of liberal internationalism and provided a seedbed for US 
foreign policy. The operation and interests represented by the CFR were overwhelmingly 
from the East Coast elite, including businessmen, lawyers, and technocrats.2 Membership 
was confined to influential people who shared an internationalist perspective, one that 
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linked national interests with the interests of the US business class.3 The idea behind the 
CFR, like its British sister organization Chatham House, was to establish a platform from 
which to construct a well-informed public opinion. Public opinion would then be 
channeled to support changes in governmental policy.4 Considering the emerging status 
of the United States, the CFR’s policy recommendations were distinctly liberal with the 
objective of opening up the entire globe for economic interaction. 
The need for an organization like the CFR developed from the institutional 
inadequacy of the American governmental to formulate a reasoned international policy. 
US foreign policy in the early twentieth century was weak and incoherent. A lack of 
national purpose caused mistrust by foreign governments and a failure to develop a 
strong international presence. The CFR started as an institution that intended to redress 
the American political realities of local-based constituents and pork-barrel patronage 
whose outlook stopped at the nation’s border.5 Studying society through an emerging 
technique of combining academic social science and business expertise, the CFR 
associated itself with federal agencies and then advocated for solutions to deep-seated 
international problems. If the United States were to take its rightful place and fulfill its 
mission as a world leader, it would need a foreign policy that was internationally 
orientated as well as bipartisan. The nation’s strong isolationist attitude was inward 
looking and out of date; the United States needed to expand its policy perspectives to 
internationalism. To accomplish this, the electorate would have to be united behind a 
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modern political attitude.6 With the emergence of a global crisis in the 1930s leading to 
the start of WWII, the CFR saw an opportunity to inject itself into the US foreign policy 
by creating a structure and improving the cooperation among nations through the 
expansion of international commerce.  
The influence of the CFR was significant in that its proposed concept of an 
expanded national interest, through international commercial development, eventually 
became the foundation of State Department foreign policy. The basis for discussion of the 
post-WWII national interest was first defined within an economic framework, focusing 
on long-term economic trends that would benefit the United States. The national interest 
was coupled to a “Grand Area,” identifying which foreign interests and regions of the 
world would best satisfy US needs.7 Through the CFR, the American business class 
became the dominant influence in the proposed expansion of American influence 
overseas. Based on a policy of open access to raw materials and markets, this 
opportunity, one that was expected to establish an environment of peace and prosperity, 
was extended to all nations of the world. 
The CFR formulated a process for the development of policy; it centered on a 
study group of experts and researchers.8 The process involved four stages: determination 
and analysis of anticipated problems engaging US interests; consideration of alternative 
solutions for these problems; selection of the preferred solution and its formulation as a 
policy recommendation; and a decision on policy recommendations that constituted the 
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position taken by the United States in international negotiations.9 At the onset of WWII, 
the CFR was better positioned than any other US interest group to influence the foreign 
policy structure of the US government.   
In 1939, it seemed clear that the future interests of the United States would 
change. Members of the CFR and their acquaintances at the State Department saw this 
development as an unparalleled opportunity. In early September of that year, Hamilton 
Armstrong Fish, Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive Director of 
the CFR, paid a visit to the State Department to offer their assistance. The CFR could 
provide the State Department with research data and expert opinion to supplement 
official policy. State Department officers welcomed Fish and Mallory and encouraged 
them to generate a detailed plan. In December 1939, the CFR established the War and 
Peace Studies Group under the direction of four general committees: Security and 
Armaments, Political, Territorial, and Economic and Financial.10 Over the life of the War 
and Peace Studies Group, 1939 to 1945, a total of 682 documents were prepared for and 
sent to the State Department for consideration.11 The most prolific of these study groups 
was the Economic and Financial Committee, highlighting the importance that the CFR 
placed on the economic policy as the basis for the postwar policy. 
Membership on the War and Peace Studies Group led to other work directly 
related to the settlement of postwar problems, and most members were in both the CFR 
and the US State Department. The CFR claimed that its members “were better prepared 
to carry out their official duties as a result of having given long and specialized study to 
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the problems of postwar settlement.”12 The list of US State Department employees who 
were both members of the CFR and closely involved in official postwar planning 
included Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, Norman Davis, Isaiah Bowman, Dr. 
Leo Pasvolsky, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Dean Acheson, William Diebold, Jr., and 
Adolf Berle.13 Although this group of co-members did not include Hull, every other 
major State Department official who had influence over early postwar planning was also 
a member of the CFR.     
Between 1939 and 1942, the links between the CFR and the State Department 
became increasingly interwoven. In February 1941, the CFR added a Division of Special 
Research and appointed a State Department official, Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, its director. This 
close working relationship was further strengthened in 1942 when the State Department 
organized the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies (ACPFP) under the 
direction of Hull. Welles was appointed its vice chairman and Pasvolsky its executive 
officer.14 This was essentially a transfer of the CFR postwar planning structure to the 
State Department. Completely absorbed and reinvented in the State Department, the War 
and Peace Studies Group was effectively transformed from a private entity to a 
governmental operation and placed at the head of the State Department policy 
formulation apparatus.15 The transfer of membership from the CFR to the ACPFP meant 
that the objectives of the CFR became the objectives of the State Department.  
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The ACPFP 
          On December 22, 1941, Hull sent a letter to Roosevelt confirming that in 
accordance with the president’s desire, a special committee known as the Advisory 
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies had been created to prepare for the countries 
participation in the resolution of international problems that would likely confront the 
United States after the defeat of the forces of aggression. This committee would be 
charged with studies and recommendations that would be submitted to the president. The 
purpose of the ACPFP was to establish and maintain contact with all appropriate 
departments of any governmental and non-governmental agencies that were in a position 
to contribute. Hull further stated that “all conversations or negotiations with foreign 
governments bearing on postwar problems be conducted, under your authority, by or 
through the Department of State.”16 The ACPFP advised in the fields of security, 
economics, and other fields requiring international cooperation.17 The ACPFP established 
a framework for all postwar decisions concerning America’s economic relationship with 
the rest of the world.18 With the creation of the ACPFP, postwar planning became the 
exclusive domain of the State Department. At this early date, there was no 
interdepartmental debate of postwar policy. The State Department, which was heavily 
influenced by internationalist economic policy, was free to develop its own vision. This 
did not mean that their policy positions would later be accepted, but it did mean that they 
had a head start over other departments and were able to spend the necessary time to 
devolving a plan based on reason.  
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During the initial phase of discussion between 1939 and 1943, the outcome of the 
war had not yet been determined. Although a complete victory was not assured, planners 
assumed that the United States would be a principle power after the war and would 
accept major responsibility for determining the character of the postwar world. It was 
understood that the preparation for peace would take much time and need careful 
consideration.19 The nature and character of postwar states and their international 
relationships were at the core of the ACPFP discussions. There was a concern that a 
hastily developed plan, like those later developed in 1944 at other branches within the US 
government, would repeat the same bad outcome of the post-WWI period. To avoid 
repeating the same mistakes made after WWI, a fundamental change—one built on 
economic interdependence at mutual prosperity—was needed in the structure of 
international relationships. 
Committee discussion was flexible, not rigid or preconceived, and membership 
was becoming more diversified. By 1943, the work of the committee started to bring in 
personnel from other cabinet level departments, including several officials with 
interlocking committee memberships. The ACPFP added members from the houses of 
Congress, the State, Treasury, and War Departments, the Executive Branch, and private 
citizens. During this period, Hull was sick and spent much of his time out of Washington. 
In Hull’s absence, Welles held the committee under close supervision and control.20 The 
absence of Hull during this period left an open position at the State Department in which 
Welles was eager to fill. Policy discussions led by Welles and other important members, 
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like Bowman, still centered on the application of multilateralism; however, the treatment 
of Germany still posed a unique problem as committee members took a position either in 
support of or in opposition of the partitioning of Germany. Hull’s State Department as a 
whole, even in his absence, held firm on supporting international multilateralism and 
approached German prosperity not as a pro or con but how German prosperity would fit 
into a prosperous international economic structure. 
The goal of the ACPFP was to find a nonpartisan agreement on foreign policy and 
a harmony of views between the Executive and Legislative branches. Policy 
recommendations were to be coordinated by Welles and Pasvolsky, and then passed on to 
Roosevelt through Hull. “The president desired to be able to reach in his basket and to 
find whatever he needed in regard to postwar foreign policy and meantime wished to 
devote himself wholly to ways and means of winning the war.”21 It would be left to the 
ACPFP committees to determine the type of policy the United States wanted for the 
postwar period. During this period, Roosevelt gave little guidance or indication to the 
committees as to his policy preferences, and even though committee members turned out 
large amounts of memos and position papers, he never used much of it in preparation for 
high-level conferences at Teheran and Yalta. 
The most important of the ACPFP committees was the economic subcommittee 
headed by Pasvolsky. Pasvolsky was Hull’s favorite, a Russian born trade expert who 
immigrated to the United States in 1905 and joined the State Department in 1934.22 Just 
like Hull, Pasvolsky was committed to an international order based on multilateralism. 
                                                 
21 Notter, United States, and Department of State., Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945., 1949, 
79. 
22 Kenneth Weisbrode, “The Master, the Maverick, and the Machine: Three Wartime Promoters of Peace,” 
Journal of Policy History 21, no. 4 (October 2009): 368. 
                                                                                                                                  
  
53
 
Membership on the economic subcommittee also included Adolf Berle, Norman Davis, 
Dean Acheson, and Dexter White. On March 6, 1942, the Economic Subcommittee held 
its first meeting to consider Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement and the 
comparative merits of bilateral and multilateral approaches to their implementation. The 
main point of agreement among committee members was that pursuant to the Lend-Lease 
agreement, all signatures that received lend-lease aid must, as a quid pro quo 
arrangement, develop policies for the elimination of discriminatory trade practices and 
trade barriers.23 In 1942, under the direction of Hull, the State Department’s main 
concern for the postwar period was to rid the world of trade barriers. The State 
Department believed that nations, like Great Britain, in critical need of aid and very 
resistant to the potential loss of its trade preference, must as part of any lend-lease 
agreement include a quid pro quo for their elimination of all discriminatory trade 
practices.  
Policy Papers Produced by CFR and ACPFP Members 
From 1941 to 1944, officials from the ACPFP and the CFR composed and 
submitted a number of policy papers and recommendations for the postwar period. Many 
of these directly affected economic policy and were influential during the upcoming 
German occupation. The ideas and policies in the three papers discussed in this section 
expressed the views of the State Department and were considered to be rational and 
carefully planned. These papers called for the development of a prosperous commercial 
policy, the elimination of industrial cartels, and a reparation policy that would benefit 
both the giving and receiving nations. The ideas addressed in these three position papers 
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would later come under attack from Executive, Treasury, and War Department officials 
as part of an interdepartmental conflict. Although the policy recommendations of the 
ACPFR in 1944 had a striking similarity to the eventual policy arrived at by the late 
1940s, the following recommendations were challenged by situational problems during 
the military occupation period and tested as Cold War tensions grew between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  
Percy W. Bidwell, a member of both the CFR and the War and Peace Studies 
Group and an advisor to ACPFP, wrote a policy paper in 1944 entitled “Postwar Controls 
of the German Economy.” Bidwell recommended that policy should not be vengeful but 
targeted at promoting German prosperity. Compensation for victims of German 
aggression and procedures for disarmament should be designed to lay the foundations for 
recovery on an international scale. “The victors should reject measures designed to 
reduce Germany to a position of permanent economic inferiority. On the contrary, they 
should plan their policy so as to make possible eventually receiving the defeated nation, 
if its behavior in the interim is satisfactory, on equal terms into the international 
organization.”24 Bidwell emphasized that his liberal policy recommendations would 
require the victor nations to devote themselves to the prevention of further German 
aggression over a period of time. In addition, to implement a liberal commercial policy 
for Germany, it would be necessary to ensure Russian collaboration with both the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Failing such collaboration, a Russo-German 
rapprochement would seem certain.25 Bidwell proposed that the United States seek a 
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collaborative policy with its Allies and be willing to stay in Germany for however long it 
would take. 
Bidwell further recommended that economic hostility should not be continued 
after military hostilities have ended. Within three months of surrender, the naval blockade 
of German ports should be lifted. Germany at once should be accorded most-favored-
nation status from each of the United Nations, and German tariffs should be lowered to 
make their economy more interdependent with the world. With allied cooperation, a 
lengthened occupation would be unnecessary, reducing burdensome occupation costs and 
speeding up economic recovery.26 Allied occupation policy should not weaken German 
production but should be used to serve the restoration of a vigorous economic life in 
those European countries that depend on German markets and supplies. All postwar rules 
of occupation should seem evenhanded to the German people and not breed resentment. 
Economic controls would not be self-enforcing; they would require the constant diligence 
of victor nations.27 The United States must be careful that the implementations of controls 
do not arouse rivalry and friction between Allied nations in the event that economic gains 
become unequally distributed. 
The redevelopment of German industries might be objected to because it was 
believed that peacetime industries could be converted back to war type production. This 
was not a valid concern because conversion was a time-consuming process and could not 
be carried out openly in postwar German on a large scale. Dismantling war industry did 
not mean destroying industry. Germans should be permitted to salvage the plant 
equipment from their armaments industry that could be converted to peacetime 
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production uses.28 The remedy for the postwar was not the imposition of rigid limitations 
but the establishment of flexible general conventions dealing with commercial policy of 
which Germany must subscribe.29 The recommendations of this policy paper reflect a 
liberal approach to the treatment of postwar Germany; these ideas were uniform with the 
line of thought at the State Department but would run into future challenges from other 
sectors of the government.     
Arthur Gayer and Alvin Hansen, members of both the CFR and the War and 
Peace Studies Group and contributors to the ACPFP, wrote a policy paper in 1944 
entitled “The Control of International Cartels.” This paper outlines important 
recommendations for postwar commercial policy pertaining to industrial cartels in 
Germany, and highlights the unyielding position of the US State Department in 
opposition to industrial cartels. The paper warns that if the United States continues to 
pursue its traditional isolationist policy, we shall see a persistent development of 
international cartels from which American firms will be excluded. Further, the effect of 
WWII will be to reinforce the tendencies toward cartelization because a pursuit of 
expansive policy will create excess productive capacity and the ability to dump products 
overseas.30 The State Department placed a great emphasis on the danger of German 
industrial cartels, and felt that if they could not be eliminated they should be regulated 
into a free and prosperous system.    
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The authors recommended that an international agency should be established in 
which industrial cartel type agreements would be filed, disclosed, and regulated.31 This 
agency would have authority over more than just one industry, and controls over cartels 
would be made on a case-by-case basis.32 The overall goal was that specific cartel 
agreements were only allowed if they were mutually beneficial and fit a scheme of an 
expansive international economy.33 Most industrial cartel agreements crossed national 
borders. Nations in the past often felt that they needed to join in or be left out; therefore, 
cartel arrangements should be negotiated alongside tariff reductions as both policies cross 
national borders and are complimentary of each other.34     
The key factor in postwar was reparation policy. William Diebold, Jr., a member 
of both the CFR War and Peace Studies Group and an advisor to ACPFP, wrote a paper 
in 1944 entitled “What shall Germany Pay? The New Reparations Problem,” Diebold 
warned that a danger would have existed if reparation policy were influenced by political 
and military circumstances and not the most efficient and expansive economic policies. 
German goods and services would be transferred to claimant countries only if certain 
conditions are met and skillful management is exercised.35 Diebold recommends that 
reparation policy should conform to the following principles: reparations should only be 
imposed to the extent that they contribute to the strengthening of the postwar world 
economic order; there should be no financial reparations; the amounts of goods and 
services that are removed should be limited; obligations should be stated in specific 
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amounts and specific types; the duration of the reparation period should be short; and 
reparations should not be relied on as a major instrument of control over Germany.36    
Diebold’s paper calls for the creation of a United Nations Reparations 
Commission to formulate and coordinate a policy. The commission should decide 
whether such goods could be supplied from Germany without impairing the efficiency of 
the German productive plant below a certain level or reducing living standards below a 
certain level. Diebold expected that the Russian government would put forth a strong 
demand for reparations. Early estimates of legitimate Russian needs reached 200 billion 
dollars.37 At this time, Russia must recognize that full compensation could not be 
expected from Germany. At Tehran Stalin asked for 20 billion, an amount for which 
Roosevelt would not guarantee. From the Russian point of view, reparation payments 
should have been made to those whose damage was the largest as compared to their total 
national wealth. They were expecting that payments could be made in kind or in the form 
of manpower labor provided by German workers. Contrary to the Russian position, the 
British did not want to repeat the problem created by the last war, and consequently, they 
were not looking for any significant reparation payments.38 
The State Department appreciated that the postwar German economy would be in 
a delicate condition; a harsh reparation policy would cause serious harm not only to 
Germany but all of Europe. State Department planners understood that like any other type 
of foreign debt, reparation obligations could be repaid only by exporting more than was 
imported or by liquidation of foreign assets. The total value of Germany’s foreign assets 
was not great in comparison to the amounts of reparations sought. To pay reparations by 
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exporting without receiving anything in return reduced the funds available to Germany 
for investment, consumption, and commercial materials.39 If the goods, capital 
equipment, and labor payments to be transferred were not chosen carefully, the 
reparations process could have had bad consequences for both Germany and the receiving 
nations.40 Under a wise reparations plan, Germany would recover slower but would be 
working at full capacity gearing its reparations into Europe’s general economic 
expansion. The fulfillment of Germany’s own economic requirement could be managed 
and timed until it would help take up the slack in demand following an expected postwar 
boom. 
Diebold placed a great deal of emphasis on how a reparation plan should be 
designed. It is important to understand that for the State Department, the purpose of 
reparations was to jump-start the whole European economy and not for the benefit of any 
one nation. The types of goods used to make payments would be crucial to both Germany 
and the receiving nation. Unless reparations in the form of goods received are of a kind 
that would have to be imported anyway, reparations would likely depress the receiving 
nation’s economy. A poorly planned reparations program could also adversely affect the 
economy of a third party nation. The types of goods exported from a debtor country can 
make a significant difference; it would have been advisable for reparations to be paid 
with goods in which Germany had a competitive advantage.41 A heavy reparations bill 
would have a negative impact and would put an unreasonable low ceiling on the living 
standards of Germany, while a lighter reparations bill would have been a positive 
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influence and produced a core of demand that could have stimulated the German 
economy. 
During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union removed large quantities 
of capital equipment. In 1944, Diebold questioned the desirability to Russia and other 
receiving nations of taking capital equipment as a form of reparations. At the end of the 
war, much of Germany’s equipment would be old and in need of maintenance or obsolete 
and inefficient. It is possible that capital equipment gained in the form of reparation 
payments could fill the immediate need until newer equipment could be procured. From 
Germany’s point of view, the loss of its older capital equipment could clear the way for 
new and modern equipment and might secure an advantage over the receiving countries 
that would not have the same need to modernize.42 The very nature of reparations went 
against the grain of planning for prosperity. The State Department understood how 
difficult it was to take capital equipment from one economic environment like Germany, 
and successfully transplant it into another foreign economic environment like Russia.    
State Department recommendations by Diebold and others dictated that German 
reparation policy be determined by considering its effect on the overall world economy, 
not on the positive or negative effect on just one country. Obligations of defeated nations 
should be based on their abilities and usefulness, not a total owed.43 If Europe was to 
become economically viable after the war, Germany’s reparations needed to be light 
enough to permit this. Reparations should be used in such a way as to promote rapid 
recovery and to be managed on the basis of what can be achieved rather than bowing to 
political pressure.  
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Isaiah Bowman, the Attainment of American Economic Lebensraum 
Isaiah Bowman and Sumner Welles were two high-level State Department policy 
makers deeply involved in formulating postwar German policy. Both agreed with the 
basic principles of multilateralism and universal prosperity, but their ideas and ambitions 
for Germany, in particular, were in direct conflict with each other.  
Isaiah Bowman was a key figure in the development of postwar policy for both 
WWI and WWII. As head of the American Geographical Society for twenty years, his 
expertise in territorial matters was highly prized by the US State Department. He was 
also a member in high standing at the CFR, serving as its director and vice-president over 
the duration of his membership. Bowman’s work as a State Department postwar planner 
began in 1940, two years before the United States was in the war. He had become a major 
influence in the process of freeing the colonies of the European powers and opening them 
up for US commercial development.44 As WWII progressed, Bowman, like others at the 
State Department, came to realize that territorial issues should be considered less 
important compared to immediate military questions and postwar economic 
considerations. This approach conflicted with the views of Roosevelt and his closest 
advisors who believed that settling European accounts would come before the 
development of a broader State Department’s priority for a “New World Order.”45 
Bowman’s fundamental ideas about postwar planning coincided with most other 
members of the CFR and the State Department, although strong differences arose 
predominately over policy concerning a proposed German partition.   
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Bowman saw the need for a change in US foreign policy based on the Russian 
Revolution in 1917 and not the rise of the Nazis in 1933. For Bowman, the rise of a 
Communist Soviet Union became a lightning rod for the emergence of a new liberal 
foreign policy. The United States could no longer count on its good intentions to keep it 
safe and prosperous. US foreign policy needed a gradual revolution toward a new liberal 
internationalism.46 The new type of liberal internationalism proposed by Bowman would 
involve a change of perspective; global organization after WWII should be based on 
economic markets and not on occupied territory. Rather than a 1919 type World Order 
based on geopolitical arrangements; the post-WWII version of a New World Order 
should be based on economic arrangements. In a world of declining empires, Bowman 
foresaw an “American Economic Lebensraum.”47 Control of economic resources, like 
raw materials, workforces, and markets, was the direct key to national survival and 
growth. Rather than measuring global power by an accumulation of territory, the new 
global nexus would be established by trade and market share. 
In the interwar years, Bowman was involved in an academic conflict with the 
German geographical community. At international geographical conferences during the 
early 1930s, Bowman openly expressed his concerns over the nature of German 
geopolitics. At the time, he saw the rapid growth of a geopolitical pseudoscience in 
German academia based on false notions of national territories. German geographical 
academics were developing a preconceived system of political geography and making 
facts conform to it. Bowman recognized this nationalist scheme in German political 
geography. The Germans thought of the state as an organism apart from individuals that 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 204. 
47 Ibid., 318. 
                                                                                                                                  
  
63
 
compose it. They spoke in terms of the rights of the state and the progressive 
development of the state.48 In the late 1930s, Nazi propagandists added to the concept of 
an expanded German Lebensraum by developing Grosswirtschaftsraum (greater 
economic sphere), the argument that every great power had at its disposal vast territory 
on which to develop its economic system. Great Britain and France had their colonies, the 
United States and the Soviet Union had vast frontiers, and Japan had secured territory in 
Asia. It was only a powerful Germany that had been confined to an undersized and 
overpopulated space.49 
Ideas about postwar international territorial organization fit into two different 
groups: regionalism and globalism. Regionalism, in which Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Welles were advocates, was an idea that nations within a certain geographical region 
would band together to coordinate policy. Each region of the world would be policed by a 
superpower. There still could be an international organization, but it would do little more 
than coordinate the work of the regional organizations. Globalism, the other faction 
whose advocates included Hull, Pasvolsky, Bowman, favored a single strong global 
based organization to coordinate all policy. Early in the debate process, regionalism 
promoted by Welles, was on the assent; but by the summer of 1943, with the persuasive 
power of Bowman, views at the State Department were changing; most influential people 
were now in favor of a globalist system. Hull felt that he and Bowman had also been 
successful in changing Roosevelt’s point of view, and was confident enough to state in 
his November 18, 1943 address to Congress that there would no longer be a need for 
spheres of influence, alliances, or balance of power. The great powers must act together 
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toward a single goal of a United Nations organization.50 It seems that Bowman and the 
State Department were successful in changing US postwar planning toward a policy that 
relied less on territorial possessions and more toward a market driven economic scheme 
of global expansion. In late 1943, at the conference in Tehran between the three major 
Allied powers, Stalin was prepared to press his territorial demands, but the US State 
Department back in Washington was developing their own global scheme based on a 
single global network of economic integration that extended beyond territorial borders.51 
 
 
Sumner Welles, Europe, and Early Proposals for World Design 
During WWII, Welles—a man whose vision would push the US postwar 
transformation from a major power to a superpower and an architect of the coming 
“American Century”—became Roosevelt’s chief spokesman on foreign affairs. Welles, a 
self-professed internationalist, endeavored to promote the needs of an expanding 
American economy. His close personal ties to Roosevelt, along with the marginalization 
of Hull’s within the administration, enabled Welles to play a more pivotal role in postwar 
planning than he might have otherwise enjoyed.52 In 1937, Welles was appointed 
Undersecretary of State and took full advantage of his situation. At the time, he was 45 
years old, energetic, ambitious, and a long-time friend of Roosevelt. In contrast, Hull was 
66 years old and in poor health. Welles, a well-traveled linguist, seemed a better fit to 
lead the State Department than Hull, who spoke only English and never left the United 
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States.53 Welles’ philosophy at the State Department was that the US foreign policy 
should be based on enlightened self-interest. He put emphasis on long-range plans, 
establishing a New World Order and an international organization that would provide 
peace and security. His policy was designed to be proactive, expand trade relations, and 
improve relations with the Soviet Union.54 Welles personified the approaching vision of 
the US State Department, but his forceful style ran against the grain of Hull’s authority.    
When Welles entered office, he began a sweeping reorganization of the State 
Department. In a pre-Churchill era (1937–1940), he pushed US foreign policy into an 
activist anti-Nazi agenda and continued to search for ways for Washington to play a more 
active role in the European crisis and develop closer ties to the Soviet Union. Welles, 
unlike the rest of the cabinet, was one of the few administration officials to openly 
support Roosevelt’s proposed use of pre-war economic pressure to combat aggressor 
nations, like Germany and Japan.55 Welles’ foreign policy influence crossed department 
lines, as he was an important figure in both the State Department and the Executive 
Branch of the government. 
After his appointment, Welles became the driving force behind the 
administrations reorientation of foreign policy, which included an assumption of US 
leadership for collective security, a free trade policy, and the calling of regular 
international conferences to coordinate US interests. In 1937, he pressed for Washington 
to act affirmatively toward German aggression in Europe. He thought that Hitler was not 
acting in its long-term interests but on a case-by-case basis. He developed the Welles 
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Plan, which called for diplomatic conferences and international economic measures to 
combat aggression in an early demonstration of US/Allied unity. Welles intention was to 
send a message to the world that the United States was going to play a more assertive role 
in world affairs in an effort to discourage German aggression. Hull, along with many at 
the State Department, rejected Welles’ proposals on the basis that they were too 
aggressive.56 Despite an American public that seemed to support isolationism and a State 
Department to timid to act, Welles continued to speak publicly of a proactive United 
States pursuing a New World Order.57 Welles was Roosevelt’s right-hand man at the 
State Department, and with Hull’s deteriorating health, there was an influential position 
open for Welles to fill.  
The uneasiness between Welles and Hull had more to do with personality than 
with policy. Welles and Hull were in agreement on most State Department policies. Both 
believed that the United States must change its international image characterized by the 
Monroe Doctrine. They felt that the US foreign policy had been based on unilateralist 
scheme, aroused legitimate suspicions, and prevented growth of inter-American interests. 
In a postwar world, the United States can no longer maintain a unilateral approach and 
limit itself to the Western Hemisphere. We must now embrace a multilateral position on 
an expansive scale.58 The prosperity of the United States depends on the prosperity of the 
rest of the world; by insulating the Western Hemisphere from international trade, the 
United States would contribute to a depression. Only with fair trade policies can the 
United States prevent the economic disasters of the past from reoccurring. Policies like a 
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strict application of the Monroe Doctrine and the Ottawa agreements were obstacles to 
world prosperity.59 Welles’ aggressive interpretation of policy, especially toward 
Germany, was what distinguished him from Hull. Hull became increasingly uneasy with 
Welles proactive approach to the looming German threat in Europe causing a split at the 
State Department.  
Welles believed the Germans had a false impression of the Monroe Doctrine and 
were using that to advance their own foreign policy position. Welles maintained that the 
Monroe Doctrine has never in reality been anything more than a unilateral declaration by 
the United States that it would not permit any non-American power to interfere in the 
political relations of the Western Hemisphere. It neither implied what the Germans 
claimed—the exclusion by the United States of non-Americans’ powers from having any 
trade relations with other American Republics—nor did it imply that the United States 
had political power over its southern neighbors.60 American policy should make it clear 
that even though political interference was not welcome free trade relations were.  
Welles was also a strong advocate of improved relations with the Soviet Union. 
He felt that many US officials had an “insane delusion” that communism and democracy 
could not coexist. From a historical and a geopolitical perspective, Welles argued that the 
United States and Russia were natural allies, and for the first time in its history, the 
current Soviet government was guided by the popular will of its people.61 There were no 
traditional or material grounds for antagonism between the people of Russia and the 
people of the United States. In recent years, the Soviet government has discarded many of 
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its most radical programs. From the Russian Revolution until WWII, the diplomatic 
relationship between the US and the USSR has been troubled.62 In the postwar world, the 
United States should develop solid relations with the USSR. The fact that the United 
States is a Western power makes it natural for Russia to be suspicious, but better 
diplomatic relations will be beneficial for both nations.63 Welles’ positive attitude of the 
Soviets affected his policy recommendations on Germany. Welles saw Germany as a 
rogue nation in which its European interests did not align with those of the United States.  
 
Early Perspectives on German Partition 
One of the most daunting concerns for postwar planners was how to finally curb 
Germany’s expansionist ambitions. The debate centered on whether to partition the 
country. Welles, a regionalist, was in favor of German dismemberment. Bowman, 
Pasvolsky, and Hull were against German dismemberment.64 How a State Department 
official lined up on German partition depended on two points. Those who looked to a 
postwar world based on multilateralism rather than territorial concerns tended to favor a 
unified Germany, whereas those who looked to regional spheres of influence based on 
borders were more likely to favor a partition of Germany. A second factor depended on a 
person’s views of the Soviet Union. Those with positive attitudes toward the Soviets 
tended to favor a divided Germany. Leaders concerned about Soviet aggression in Europe 
were in favor of a united Germany.  
          Welles and the ACPFP planners began the process of planning postwar policy by 
assuming a complete defeat and unconditional surrender. Welles had strong views on 
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German reconstruction. He felt that a dismembered, non-expansionist, and reconstructed 
Germany could be an integral part of an integrated Europe; the new Germany should be 
decentralized and returned to its “pre-Bismarckian period.” A unified Germany would be 
too strong and would not be able to promote European postwar stability.65 In contrast, 
Bowman claimed that in the long term, Russia would constitute a greater threat than 
Germany. If the United States divides Germany, it may be forced in ten years to ask 
Germany to reunite for the purpose of holding Russia in place.66 Bowman also felt that 
the United States had no choice but to occupy postwar Germany and assume a greater 
responsibility for European affairs. 
The central argument for the planners in 1942 focused on whether Germany or the 
Soviet Union was going to constitute a future threat. From the start, ACPFP members 
drew sides with either Welles, who held a deep-seated antagonism for Germany, or with 
Bowman, whose greatest concern was an aggressive Soviet Union. Bowman alleged that 
a strong united Germany was needed as a counterpoise to the Soviet Union. Welles felt 
that Germany’s power should be weakened by dividing the nation into a confederation of 
autonomous republics held together only by a Zollverein, or customs union.67 Welles saw 
his plan as a compromise; German districts would be large enough to support themselves 
but not so large as to be a threat. He believed that dismemberment would eliminate 
Germany’s two major internal threats: the Junker class and the German General Staff. 
The consensus of US planners changed over time. In 1941, when German troops 
were driving into Russia, it seemed imperative that the breaking up the German nation 
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was the only solution. By 1943, with Soviet troops pushing back the Nazis, concern over 
Soviet domination of Europe was taking hold.68 As Allied troops advanced across the 
western front, many on the State Department planning committee started to change their 
mind in favor of a united Germany. In addition to concerns about Soviet expansion, many 
State Department planners felt that a divided Germany would be more difficult to 
integrate into an American-led global economic system.69 As the end of the war 
approached, the State Department focused on developing policy recommendations based 
on how the German economy would fit into a postwar Europe and not on geopolitical 
concerns.   
Bowman and Welles may have been fighting for the same postwar US 
international concept of a grand area, but their views differed sharply as to Germany’s 
proper position in Europe.70 Welles’ deep-seated antagonism for what he believed was a 
German tendency toward authoritarianism. He rejected what he felt was Berlin’s 
nationalist centralized authority over a widely divergent group of German peoples. In 
contrast, Bowman was motivated by economics and his anxiety over the Soviet Union. 
All that was needed to prevent a resurgent German nationalism was disarmament. Peace 
and prosperity could be achieved without economic and political dismemberment.71 
Bowman believed that the centrality of German industrial capability was critical to the 
future of European prosperity and necessary to impede Soviet influence.  
Welles’ views on partition stemmed from his belief that the root problem was the 
centralization of German power in Berlin. This process had created the ability for the 
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Germans to become a menace. Individual Germanic states by themselves are not a threat; 
therefore, the solution is to weaken Germany by partition. Welles claimed that there was 
no valid reason why the German economy would be ruined by partition.72 The three 
German states proposed by Welles (see maps below) would have a balanced economy 
with portions of industrial, agricultural, and mineral resources. 
Welles’ position most likely came from his views on both German history and the 
tendencies of the German people. For Welles, history has shown that Germany had never 
made any constructive contribution to world peace or regional peace. He acknowledged 
German contributions to civilization but believed that the problem originated with the 
willingness of the German people to fight for the German General Staff. Welles argued 
that Germany may undergo defeat in WWII, but the German General Staff is a living 
force that will re-inspire the German people to threaten the future peace of Europe.73 The 
Nazi national psychology cannot be modified solely by a change in governmental 
structure. Democracy must come from the people themselves; the current German youth 
are poisoned and it might take some time before democracy can be established.74 
Therefore, Welles believed that his nuance position would provide European security by 
dividing Germany, but also that a series of Germanic states would be viable enough to 
contribute to the economic recovery of Europe.    
 
Department Rivals Push Back  
In August 1944, a storm was brewing over the postwar treatment of Germany and 
about to challenge the direction of State Department postwar planning. Both the Treasury 
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Department and Roosevelt had distinctly different views on Germany and were about to 
start an intergovernmental conflict that would have long-term ramifications. The State 
Department had been working on planning since 1939 and had reached somewhat of 
censuses with both the War Department and the British for the promotion of the German 
economy. By 1944 officials from various branch of the government were starting to draw 
up maps for postwar Germany, and it is from these maps that we can get a sense of the 
state of the debate in 1944 concerning the direction of postwar policy.       
All three of the following maps are dated from 1944. Each map highlights the 
motivating forces behind the official who created them. The Sumner Welles map for the 
proposed division of Germany was rooted in State Department policy in which 
multilateral economic prosperity was a key concern. It was a carefully designed proposal 
by which Germany was divided in an attempt to maintain the economic viability of each 
German State, while satisfying Welles’ distrust of a large central German state. Welles’ 
desire to partition Germany sets him apart from most other State Department planners. 
His motivation was to seek a middle ground and break up German military and political 
power while still allowing for all the German industrial regions to contribute to European 
prosperity. 
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Sumner Welles Map 194475 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, the Roosevelt map reveals a different perspective on how to approach 
the partition of Germany. The president’s delineations were made on a map of physical 
geography void of any solid political boundaries, as if all the boundaries of Central 
European nations were wide open for modification. Roosevelt’s zones dividing Northern, 
Central, and Southern Germany were drawn in a haphazard manner, possibly an 
expression of his desire to put off final plans for the partition of Germany until the 
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occupation started. It is clear from this map that in 1944, Roosevelt had made no careful 
consideration for the economic welfare of these future German states. 
 
FDR Map76  
 
 
 
Finally, the Morgenthau map shows no concern for the economic maintenance of 
a German state. Major tracts of highly productive regions would have been given away. 
Poland would get Upper Silesia, France would get the Saarland,  and all of Rhine and 
Saxony areas would be put under international control. Many of Germany’s major ports 
would be lost and much of the nation would be landlocked, cut off from international 
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commerce. It seems clear that the objective of Morgenthau’s proposal was to cripple 
Germany. 
 
 
Treasury Department Map77 
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Chapter III 
1944–1945: Interdepartmental Struggle 
 
The Treasury Department Offensive—August 1944 
            August 1944 was the starting point for a crisis in the postwar planning process. 
The Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., with an unwelcome provocation, 
tried to change the direction of postwar planning that was already well underway at the 
State and War Departments.1 The disturbance by Morgenthau was unexpected, like a 
sudden storm catching the State and War Departments by surprise. Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson, agreeing with Hull over the egregious nature of the interference, 
referred to this incident as the most contentious interdepartmental struggle of his thirty-
five year cabinet-level career.2 Morgenthau’s intrusion into the planning for the 
occupation of Germany went far beyond the legitimate agenda of the Treasury 
Department. By the summer of 1944, both the State and War Departments had been 
making like-minded contributions to a policy plan that would lead to a constructive peace 
for Germany and Europe as a whole. In a single purposeful stroke, Morgenthau forced 
American policy toward Germany to take a dramatic turn that would cause detrimental 
ramifications for Germany and Europe during the first three years of the postwar period. 
This was not the first time that Morgenthau had interfered. Hull had grown 
resentful of the Treasury Secretary from his earliest days in government. Hull alleged that 
Morgenthau seldom lost an opportunity to step into State Department jurisdiction and 
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obstruct policy. Often times he was found to be conducting negotiations with foreign 
governments on his own.3 Hull believed that Morgenthau was driven by emotion and 
frequently sought to use his close relationship with the president to induce actions that 
were contrary to the State Department’s better judgment. Hull considered Morgenthau’s 
interference in postwar planning for the occupation of Germany as his worst offence.4   
After August 1944, any chance of a studied rational approach to postwar policy in 
Washington was over. The policy consensus created by the planners at the State 
Department, War Department, and CFR would have to be put aside. This dispute became 
a long and bitter quarrel between cabinet-level departments in which the near term fate of 
Germany hung in the balance.5 A victory for Morgenthau would mean economic misery 
for Europe and the German people. A victory for the State Department would mean a 
faster recovery for Europe and a lessened burden on US occupation forces.  
The interference started in August 1944, upon Morgenthau’s return from a trip to 
Europe, when he informed Roosevelt about what he considered the proposed liberal 
treatment of Postwar Germany by the State and War Departments. He was referring to 
numerous State Department planning memoranda and the War Department’s 
occupational handbook. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) Handbook was to provide the US Military with instructions for the occupation. 
Morgenthau, a close personal friend and long-time aide to the president had enough 
access and influence to press Roosevelt into taking action.6 Both Roosevelt and 
Morgenthau were in favor of harsh treatment for Germany and both considered State and 
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War Department plans too sympathetic to Germany.7 On August 26, 1944, Roosevelt sent 
a memorandum to Hull and Stimson criticizing both the SHAEF Handbook and the 
State’s proposed lenient treatment of Germany. The president expected them to reassess 
their positions on the treatment of postwar Germany. 
In early September of 1944, because of his dissatisfaction with the postwar policy 
and discontent among his Cabinet members, Roosevelt called for the creation of an 
informal “Cabinet Committee on Germany” to resolve policy disagreements dealing with 
the occupation. The committee was to consist of Hull, Stimson, Morgenthau, and the 
Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins.8 The committee meetings were the beginning of 
a contentious debate between Hull and Stimson who favored rebuilding Germany and 
Morgenthau who wanted to deindustrialize Germany. The committee held only a few 
meetings that resulted in no resolution to the conflict. Roosevelt had no intension of using 
this committee to set policy, the purpose of the meeting was to resolve the turmoil within 
his cabinet. As was so often the case with the president, policy would be would be set by 
him, at his discretion.   
On September 12, 1944 at the Second Quebec Conference held with British Prime 
Minister Churchill, Roosevelt reinforced his support for Morgenthau’s plan. The agenda 
of the conference was intended to be a discussion of Allied military objectives, but 
matters turned to address Lend-Lease aid for Britain and the postwar treatment of 
Germany. With Hull and other State Department officials not in attendance the president 
had a free hand to institute postwar policy. Churchill was determined to secure additional 
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Lend-Lease aid for Britain, while Roosevelt called on Morgenthau to convince the British 
to accept Morgenthau’s plan for punitive treatment of Germany.9 In the end, a quid-pro 
quo agreement was reached in which Roosevelt and Morgenthau gained Churchill’s 
agreement for a harsh treatment of Germany; in exchange, they agreed to give Britain 
additional Lend-Lease aid.10 It was clear from the negotiations that both the Treasury 
Secretary and the president would be forceful in their desire to ensure that the postwar 
period in Germany would be a difficult one. 
Morgenthau’s actions in August and September of 1944 dismayed Hull; the 
Treasury Department’s intrusion into postwar planning was a repudiation of the State 
Department’s central doctrine of multilateralism. By advocating for economic misery in 
Germany, Morgenthau was putting the postwar prosperity of Europe and the world at 
risk.11 The difficulties between the State and Treasury Departments had implications far 
beyond the German occupation. Treasury officials were looking toward a measured 
future of monetary regulation and securitized international lending, similar to those 
recently formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference; it seemed that that they were 
limiting postwar policy to repairing the problems of the interwar period. Officials at State 
had a more grandiose policy plan; they were optimistically looking to the future with its 
vision of an expansive commercial network delivering prosperity to all. 
            The president and his Cabinet Departments all had competing ideas on ways to 
address global economic issues at the end of the war. Roosevelt saw the promotion of 
postwar global prosperity by the exportation of US New Deal-type programs in which he 
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would be free to pick winners and losers among nations. Morgenthau and his closest 
advisor at the Treasury Department, Dexter White, were striving for global financial 
security by the use of monetary regulation and the securitization of international lending. 
Hull and postwar planners at the State Department promoted a wide-open style of 
prosperity in which every nation could participate through the reduction of trade barriers 
and the elimination of quotas and cartels. Stimson at the War Department believed in an 
economic policy that aligned closely with Hull’s, but Stimson’s overriding concern was 
that the US military occupation forces in Germany should have a free hand and not be 
restricted by any departmental economic doctrine. These competing postwar ideologies 
created a conflict that contaminated the first few years of the occupation of Germany. 
The first major result of the US conflicted policy was the implementation of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff directive JCS1067. This directive was secretly issued in April 1945 
just as Allied troops were moving into Germany. Assistant Secretary of War John 
McCloy played a key role in authoring the directive and working through the 
interdepartmental struggle to get something on paper. Though he did not solve the 
interdepartmental disagreement or get unanimous approval, he did advance a document 
that gave some guidance to the military commanders in charge of the German 
occupation.12 Initially, JCS1067 appeared less punitive than Morgenthau’s plan, but the 
overall attitude of the directive implied the economic stagnation of a devastated 
Germany.13 The State Department was never in agreement with the text of the directive 
and insisted to change it as it was being written. 
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The struggle to pushback against the Morgenthau Plan was just one example of 
the effort made by the State Department to change the long-term direction of US foreign 
policy. Throughout the 1940s, they never gave up on their commitment to a multilateral 
approach, even in the face of a direct challenge from the executive and cabinet-level 
branches of government.14 The policy positions worked out by the early planners under 
the direction of Hull and Pasvolsky may have been refined and restated by the State 
Department at various points during this period, but the essence of their position was 
never abandoned.   
 
Treasury Department’s Position 
Introduction of the Morgenthau Plan grew out of the Treasury Secretary’s deep 
disgust for German conduct toward the Jews, being of Jewish descent he was morally 
outraged at Nazi racism. He and Roosevelt rejected the distinction made by the State 
Department between the German people and the Nazis. All Germans deserved harsh 
treatment, a type of forced rural resettlement program and a soup-kitchen standard of 
living.15 The Morgenthau Plan called for the dismantling of German heavy industrial 
capabilities on a massive scale. The United States should not allow Germany to rebuild 
itself and must limit its economy to agriculture and light industry. Germany would be 
partitioned, large parts of it given away to its neighbors, and the Ruhr should be 
internationalized. The country would be occupied and economic poverty would be 
enforced. There would be no economic recovery in which to pay reparations. All capital 
equipment would be disassembled and given out as remuneration. 
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A debate among historians has surfaced as to who was responsible for the 
Morgenthau Plan. The inquiry centered on White who played a crucial role in the 
formation of the Morgenthau Plan. It seems true that White was both a Communist 
sympathizer and a Soviet agent.16 However, the argument that White skillfully 
maneuvered Morgenthau into developing the plan at the command of the Soviets does not 
seem valid. Looking closely at postwar goals for the Soviet Union, if White was acting at 
the direction of the Soviets, the Morgenthau Plan would have more carefully followed 
Soviet goals. He would have allowed for a German capability to pay larger reparations 
and advocated for a united Germany in anticipation of eventual Soviet domination.17 It 
seems more likely that White’s contribution to the Morgenthau Plan was in direct 
accordance with the wishes of both Morgenthau and Roosevelt, not those of Stalin.   
Although it appears that White was not the instigator of the Morgenthau Plan, it 
was clear to State Department officials that the resourcefulness of White in mastering the 
main points of interdepartmental meetings and reports transformed Morgenthau’s vague 
knowledge and passions into a clear, well-organized statement of the Treasury’s 
position.18 He had previously attended interdepartmental meetings that addressed German 
policy, but postwar planning was not his responsibility. In July 1944, White had just 
concluded his work at the Bretton Woods Conference in which he and the Treasury 
Department had hosted. With all of the effort required to organize the Bretton Woods 
Conference, it was difficult to see how he would have been in a position to generate the 
Morgenthau Plan. However, his opinion on Germany coincided with the majority view of 
the Treasury Department and he had a full staff of Treasury officials available to help 
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assemble policy plans.19 When a liberal policy toward Germany was in the works at both 
the State and War Departments in August 1944, White was qualified and willing to 
amplify the Treasury Department’s punitive policy for which Morgenthau would fight.  
The differences of opinion on postwar economic matters between State and 
Treasury were not confined to the treatment of Germany. The two departments had a 
fundamental disagreement on how to rebuild the world economic system. The argument 
made by the Treasury Department was that full free trade would not promote general 
prosperity.20 White and the Treasury Department believed that exchange rate stabilization 
and the promotion of international investment were more practical methods of solving the 
world’s economic problems. As White stated in 1942, “The theoretical basis for the belief 
still so widely held, that interference with trade and with capital and gold movements, 
etc., are harmful, are hangovers from a nineteenth century creed, which held that 
international economic adjustments, if left alone, would work themselves out toward an 
‘equilibrium’ with a minimum of harm to world trade and prosperity. It is doubtful 
whether that belief was ever sound.”21 The type of policy advocated by the Treasury 
Department would produce a narrower range of growth in international economic activity 
than that of State Department. Even if it threatened a percentage of overall European 
output, the Treasury Department was still willing to destroy German industrial 
production.  
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In a head to head competition for the implementation of foreign policy during the 
Roosevelt presidency the Treasury had an advantage over State. Morgenthau was a long 
time confidant of the president and had always been willing to do Roosevelt’s bidding.  
By 1944, the Treasury Department had successfully challenged the ambitions of State 
Department planners and shifted the focus from free trade issues to monetary regulation 
and capital investment funds.22 The Bretton Woods Agreement sponsored by the 
Treasury, was under-funded and completed nine months before the end of the war. The 
agreement actually undercut State Department strategy, because of the relatively small 
amounts committed by its participating nations, international commerce was relegated to 
a relatively low level. 
In September 1944, it appeared as if the State Department did not have the 
political power to realize their postwar dream. As long as a close relationship existed 
between the president and Morgenthau, it would be difficult for Hull to change 
Roosevelt’s mind or challenge the Treasury Department’s initiative. The Treasury 
Department used a wide range of arguments to support its policy position. One of their 
main arguments addressed the reparations issue. The Treasury Department was against 
Germany making reparation payments. If Germany were expected to pay recurring 
reparations in the form of goods produced, then the German industrial economy would 
have to be rehabilitated.23 Both the State and Treasury Departments recognized that a 
long-term reparation program making payments from goods produced would require a 
reconstructed Germany; this was a notion to which the Treasury Department was 
vehemently opposed. 
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The Treasury Department asserted that it was a fallacy to think that Europe 
needed a strong industrial Germany. Morgenthau pointed out that the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and the Benelux could supply enough coal for Europe’s needs. The 
elimination of competition from Ruhr industry would be of great benefit to the British 
and other economies. In summary, the Treasury Department argued that Britain would 
recover faster without German competition.24 This was Morgenthau’s main selling point 
to Roosevelt. A chief concern for the president after the war and the recovery of the 
British economy, the argument that the eliminating German competition would be of 
great benefit to the British was convincing. 
Morgenthau’s based his position on the principle that economic prosperity in 
Germany would lead to future aggression. The Treasury Department maintained that 
modern German militarism had its basis in the Ruhr. This region rich in coal had been the 
foundation of an industrial apparatus that was deliberately guided by military objectives. 
The elimination of a prosperous Ruhr industrial apparatus would make future German 
aggression impossible.25 This principle was a direct contradiction to the main premise 
upon which the State Department’s developed it policy plan. The State Department 
starting planning in 1939 with the conviction that Germany’s future economic prosperity 
would lead to peace. Early postwar planners had based policy development on the 
supposition that it was economic deprivation that led to the start of WWII.  
Morgenthau’s Plan specified that no relief should be supplied to Germany other 
than what was needed to prevent disorder. The Treasury Department recommended that 
the responsibility for sustaining the German people rested with the Germans and not with 
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the Allied occupation forces. Allied Military Governments should not assume 
responsibility for price controls, rationing, unemployment, reconstruction, housing, or 
transportation. No relief supplies should be imported beyond the minimum to prevent 
disease and disorder.26 With so many punitive measures included that would cause 
postwar Germans continued misery it seems to be evident that Morgenthau’s motives 
were based on retaliation.  
By January 1945, there had been no resolution or agreement among the Cabinet 
Secretaries over the German issue. By this time, the battlefield front lines in Europe were 
changing rapidly as both Soviet and Western forces were advancing across Europe. As 
the positions of the armies changed, so did the points of contention. In a January 1945 
memorandum, Morgenthau expressed a new list of concerns to the president. It was 
important that German heavy industrial capabilities be completely destroyed, not just its 
weapons industry. The Germans were versatile just like the Americans. US industry was 
converted from a great peacetime industry in 1940 to the world’s greatest producer of 
military weapons in 1944. The German people with access to heavy industry could do the 
same. Anyone who disagreed with this point was simply expressing a fear of Russia and 
communism. Morgenthau stated, “This twenty-year old argument of a “bulwark against 
Bolshevism” is one factor of what brought this war down on us.”27 By this statement 
Morgenthau was responding to a new argument being advanced by the likes of Bowman 
and others at the State Department who were attracting converts to the anti-Soviet camp 
over concerns that Soviet armies might overwhelm Europe. 
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It was apparent through the spring of 1945 that the Morgenthau-Roosevelt 
coalition for harsh treatment of Germany was in firm control. Challenges from the State 
and War Departments had been rebuffed. Despite small changes made to the wording, the 
directive being written during at this time still ended up with a strong anti-German 
attitude.  
 
War Department’s Position 
During WWII, the influence of the military in Washington was imposing, to the 
extent that major aspects of US foreign policy became dominated by the War 
Department. In most matters, the War Department had the ability to veto any proposal 
formulated at the State Department.28 McCloy pointed out that the State Department had 
been working on a policy for postwar Germany for years; however, because of the 
preoccupation with winning the war, State Department planners were not linked to the 
War Department’s policy. After Pearl Harbor, the State Department had neither the 
budget nor the political power to rival the influence of the military.29  Even though the 
War Department had the power and position to challenge any postwar policy formulated 
by State Department planners, the State and War Departments were in agreement on 
many of the main ideals for the postwar German economy. But an even more important 
factor was the exemplary reputation of Stimson and his relationship with Hull. This 
meant that the War Department and its distinguished Secretary Stimson constituted a 
significant ally for the State Department in its struggle over the postwar treatment of 
Germany. 
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Despite the similarity between Stimson and Hull on policy, they came to their 
respective positions based on different motivations. Unlike Hull, Stimson was an 
Anglophile who believed postwar policy should center on the same concept as the 
concept the United States followed during the war—the fundamental unity of Angelo-
American interests.30 However, they both agreed with the central notion that the United 
States should become more involved in world affairs and that a future of peace would be 
based on global economic prosperity. Stimson stated, “Germany would have to be 
punished and its leadership changed, but also, Germany would have to be rebuilt and 
restored to the center of Europe’s economy.”31 He categorically opposed a punitive 
settlement that would leave Germany in a state of postwar chaos. This point was critical 
for the War Department officials because they were going to be in charge of the 
occupation, one that would be long and difficult in a chaotic situation.  
By 1944, it appeared that the US Army was going to outrun the policymakers. 
Stimson remarked to the president in August 1944, “We were running into a lack of 
preparedness. Our troops were going into Germany and they had no instructions.”32 Even 
thought SHAEF had been developed as a military occupation plan with little guidance 
from Washington, the policy laid out in the SHAEF Handbook was in harmony with the 
views of both Stimson and the State Department planners. By September 1944, Stimson 
had approved the recently completed handbook.33 It was this handbook and the 
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supporting memoranda from the State Department that Morgenthau and White had 
reacted to vehemently in August 1944.   
The overriding interest of the War Department during the occupation was its 
ability to be in complete control. Stimson and McCloy were resolute in their insistence 
that the officers in charge of Germany not be tied down to any policy principles. The 
assumption of responsibility for the occupation must be undivided and controlled by the 
military. It was felt that the occupation would be a test of the ability for the United States 
and the Soviets to cooperate. The desire for complete control was felt so strongly that the 
US military believed any combination of US and British occupation forces would not be 
advisable because it would severely limit the freedom of American policy in Europe.34 It 
was expected that the creation of separate zones for the British and US forces was a 
necessity so that the US military could have a free hand in mediation with the Soviets.  
Stimson had other reasons to support a constructive treatment; he felt that fair 
treatment of Germany would signal to the world that the United States would build a 
prosperous, peaceful world.35 Stimson was a member of a Cabinet that was deeply 
divided on occupation policy. Stimson believed that Germany would have to be the 
dominant economy for Europe to recover. Hull advocated for a viable but not dominate 
Germany. Morgenthau wanted the Germany industrial base smashed. Stimson found 
himself in strong opposition to Morgenthau. In his memorandum to the president on 
September 5, 1944, Stimson expressed his concerns over three points of Treasury’s 
economic policy and how bad its implementation would appear to the rest of the world: 
(1) that the standard of living be held down to subsistence levels; (2) that the German 
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economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; and (3) that the German 
economy must be converted so as to be dependent upon imports and exports.36 The War 
department was directly responsible for the outcome of the German occupation and he 
did not want a repeat of the Treaty at Versailles and its economically senseless demands. 
The speed of reconstruction was of great importance if the United States hoped to avoid 
great convulsions in Europe. Punitive methods would not prevent war; they would breed 
war.37 Stimson recommended that Treasury policy be discarded; perhaps the Ruhr’s 
economic resources could be put under international control, but not destroyed.38 For 
Stimson, if Europe were to recover, Germany would have to be the center of the 
European economy.  
By September 1944, to defend their position, both Stimson and Hull had to 
challenge the president on his postwar plan. As a rebuff to Roosevelt’s agreement at the 
Second Quebec Conference, Stimson sent a memorandum reiterating his point, “Sound 
thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in 
others. The only question now is whether seventy million educated, efficient, and 
imaginative German’s can be kept within the bounds on such a low level of 
subsistence.”39 Stimson reminded the president that he had declared in the Atlantic 
Charter that victors and vanquished alike were entitled to freedom from economic want. 
The harsh suppression of Germany for the benefit of other nations would go against what 
Hull had been trying to accomplish since 1933.40 However, a policy directive for the 
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military had to be written; the challenge for the War Department over the winter of 1944–
1945 was to write a directive that would get the approvals of the president and 
Morgenthau but give enough flexibility to the military to be workable in Germany. 
The War Department’s influence over the creation of JCS1067 fell on McCloy. 
He realized how difficult it would be for the military to implement the Morgenthau Plan 
in postwar Germany, so in response, he worded the directive to win the approval of the 
Treasury but still give military commanders maximum flexibility. The directive was in 
the works for most of the winter and was signed by President Truman in May 1945.41 
McCloy ensured that certain phrasing was included within the text to allow the 
occupation forces enough interruptive leeway to respond to the situation on the ground.  
 
State Department’s Position 
By August 1944, State Department policy planners were the only department to 
have spent the last five years making a persistent effort to assemble a post-war policy. 
Planners considered their work to be based on reason and held a conviction that their 
intentions for the postwar world were good. The proposed postwar policy advocated by 
the State Department was based on a set of rational assumptions with which neither 
Morgenthau nor the Treasury could agree.  
In matters concerning the postwar economy, Hull was neither pro-Germany nor 
anti-Germany. He and his department were in favor of a Germany that was integrated 
into a European world economy on the basis that this would be a requirement to achieve 
long-term peace and prosperity. Rebuilding a strong Germany was not Hull’s aspiration; 
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it was multilateral economic development that by necessity included Germany. 
Considering the recent tragedy of Nazi brutality, Hull’s position on Germany over the 
course of the planning period may have seemed detached, but he believed it was time to 
make a clean cut with his emotional ties to history and to plan a future based on optimism 
and opportunity.   
One early premise for postwar planning was that a united Germany fit into the 
State Department concept of a multilateral world. Multiple zones of occupation would be 
detrimental to international commerce. One of the forms of occupation that they had 
given serious consideration to was an inter-allied occupation.42 As early as 1942, the 
State Department was hopeful that an arrangement could be made in which there would a 
mix of Allied troops throughout all of Germany. Having a truly joint occupation with no 
national sectors would go a long way toward guaranteeing that the Allies would not 
divide Germany.43 The consensus among planners was that the forcible partition of 
Germany would create a situation based on “spheres of influence” and should be 
opposed.44 As late as 1944, they believed that both the British and the Soviets could 
eventually be persuaded to support a united multilateral Germany.45 It was not until 1947 
that the State Department came to recognize that the division of Germany might become 
a necessity to at least guarantee that the Western zones of Germany were included in a 
multilateral Europe. 
Another basis for the policy positions taken by State was the belief that the 
assimilation of the Germany economy into a grand European economy was all that was 
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necessary to end any future German military threat. In August 1944, Hull upheld his 
position that partition should not be imposed and that Germany should be assimilated into 
the world economy without discrimination and dismemberment.46 The Secretary 
maintained that the forced conversion of German economic capacity from war to peace 
production would be sufficient to eliminate any future German military threat. This 
process would cause a fundamental change in the organization of German economic life 
and, in return, would pay a large peace dividend. 47 Hull had a deep-seated confidence in 
the policy recommendations of his department. Despite genuine fears by many about the 
future security of Europe, Hull was willing to trust that sound international economic 
policy would be sufficient to eliminate future German militarism. 
            On September 5, 1944, the first Cabinet Committee meeting was held in which 
Morgenthau, Stimson, and Hull met to discuss postwar treatment of Germany. At the 
meeting, it appeared to Stimson as if Hull was in support of Morgenthau’s Carthaginian 
peace. Stimson commented that he (Stimson) was the only one at the meeting in favor of 
reconstructing Germany. Stimson speculated that Hull had buckled under the pressure of 
the president and Morgenthau, only to revert back to his longtime policy of a prosperous 
postwar Germany at a later date.48 In his memoirs, Hull explained his position in the 
meeting on September 5, 1944, stressing that at no time did he demonstrate any support 
for Morgenthau’s economic policy in Germany.49 It is evident that there was a difference 
between how Hull and Stimson approached a reconstructed Germany; however, there is 
no support shown by Hull for Morgenthau’s Plan. The lengthy evidence in the State 
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Department records along with Hull’s account of the Cabinet Committee meetings 
highlights a disagreement between Hull and Stimson, but does not indicate any support 
by Hull for Morgenthau’s plan. All positions taken by Hull at the Cabinet Committee 
meeting were consistent with long-time State department policy. The Secretary of State 
opposed German partition, opposed complete deindustrialization, and discredited the idea 
of an agriculturalized Germany.50 In the meeting on September 5, 1944, Hull presented 
and used as a basis for discussion the September 4, 1944 State Department memorandum 
in which it is stated “The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition 
of Germany.”51 In addition, “It is in the long-range interest of the United States the 
Germany be prosperous but that, at the same time, the German economy should not again 
be directed to war-like purposes.”52  
In his memoirs, Hull helped to explain what appeared to be contradictory 
comments, but were in fact consistent with long-term State department policy. Hull stated 
three objectives for postwar German economic policy. First, “the standard of living of the 
population should be held down to subsistence levels.”53 This seems punitive, but a 
distinction can be made by which the reconstruction of a prosperous Germany could 
entail the temporary enforcement of lower living standards for the purposes of rebuilding 
commerce and paying reparations. Second, “Germany’s economic position of power in 
Europe must be eliminated.”54 This statement is completely consistent with 
multilateralism by which no country becomes so dominant in a market that it infringes on 
every other nation’s free access. And third, “German economic capacity must be 
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converted in such a manner that it would be so dependent on imports and exports that the 
country could not by its own devices reconvert to war production.”55 This is also a basic 
tenant of multilateralism in which peace is guaranteed by the development of an inter-
dependent world economy. Without a clear understanding of the State Departments 
concept of global multilateralism, policy recommendations toward Germany may have 
appeared to be punitive when they were not. 
In September of 1944, Hull and the State Department still held hopes of breaking 
up the British Imperial system. In many ways, this was of greater concern to the future of 
multilateralism than a prosperous Germany. Hull wanted a multilateral European 
continent including an economically viable Germany, but the long-time State Department 
aim of bringing an end to the Ottawa Agreements was still of the highest priority.56 To 
accomplish this goal, Hull would need the support of the president. Hull had hoped that 
Roosevelt, who in the past had supported Hull’s free trade policy, would use his position 
of power over the British to convince them to bring an end the Ottawa Agreements.   
The agenda for the September 12, 1944, meeting between Roosevelt and 
Churchill at the Second Quebec Conference, was intended to focus on military matters, 
and thus Hull did not attend the conference.57 Halfway through the conference, Roosevelt 
invited Morgenthau to attend and address German economic issues with Churchill and his 
delegation. Both Roosevelt and Morgenthau were in agreement on both the postwar 
treatment of Germany and the continuation of Lend-Lease aid to Britain. The objective 
for the president was to get the British to agree to the Morgenthau Plan by the use of both 
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the persuasion of Morgenthau, and the Treasury Department’s power of the purse.58 After 
some coercion at the conference, the deal was made. Roosevelt was successful in getting 
Churchill to sign an agreement endorsing Morgenthau’s Plan while Churchill received a 
Lend-Lease commitment. Both the president and Morgenthau denied allegations of any 
quid-pro quo agreement. In a State Department memorandum addressing the agreement 
between the president and the prime minister, Morgenthau denied that there was any 
connection between the prime minister’s acceptances of Treasury Department’s policy 
for the harsh treatment of Germany and his success in obtaining a commitment from the 
United States for a second phase of Lend-Lease funds,59 It seemed obvious to a skeptical 
Hull and Stimson that such a deal had taken place. 
The Quebec Agreement upset Hull who, referring to the cessation of the Ottawa 
agreements, had a different set of priorities to negotiate with Britain. Hull remarked that 
there were a number of matters with respect to commercial policy that the State 
Department was working to get British concessions; however, because the president had 
given in on Lend-Lease aid, there was no hope of settling these matters.60 At this time, 
the long-term goal of opening up free trade with the British Commonwealth nations was 
unlikely. The president had used his bargaining power to gain a policy goal that would 
harm the long-term policy objectives of the State Department. In a meeting at Hull’s 
office, comments made by Hull expressing his displeasure with Roosevelt were recorded 
in the State department records.  
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Secretary Hull was very disturbed by the fact that the President made the 
decision on lend-lease with Britain without prior consultation with men 
who had been working on the problem for a long time. He said that there 
were a number of matters with respect to commercial policy which they 
were trying to get from the British and which the British were running 
away from, and that they were delaying decisions on the lend-lease aid to 
Britain during Phase 2 in the hope of getting the other matters settled first. 
Now, however, the President had given away that bait.61   
 
Hull felt that Roosevelt had acted improperly. He had given away the prize with 
no solid gain in return. Not only was the State Department neglected on the agreement, 
there were no economists in attendance at the conference. Both Roosevelt and Churchill 
approved the Quebec II agreement, which would have major implications for the postwar 
economy, without any consultation with US or British economic experts or foreign policy 
advisors.62 By October 1944, Hull accepted that Roosevelt would not reverse himself on 
Germany. The signing of the Quebec II agreement by the president officially recognized 
the Morgenthau Plan as US policy, but this did not deter the State Department from 
working to moderate its effect.63 Over the course of winter 1944–1945, the State 
Department tried to reassert and to refine its position in an attempt to work on the 
Treasury’s influence.  
The State Department was in a difficult position during the winter of 1944–1945. 
After the Second Quebec Conference, Roosevelt turned his back entirely on all postwar 
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planning.64 The president had done nothing to mediate the disagreement within his 
Cabinet, and then firmly voted in favor of the Morgenthau plan. Since the start of the 
dispute in August, all negotiations with the British and Soviet Allies over German policy 
had been gravely hampered. Attempts by the United States to either influence their Allies 
or to reach a consensus on postwar Germany had been frustrated.65 During this 
environment of confusion, each Department did their best to influence the wording of 
JCS1067 being prepared for the upcoming occupation.  
 
The President’s Influence over Planning 
President Roosevelt had the final say when it came to postwar policy. He often 
acted as his own State Department. His lines of communications on foreign matters by-
passed the State Department, and the ideas of the early postwar planners were definitely 
not welcome at the White House. Roosevelt also ignored the negotiations done by inter-
allied agencies, like the European Advisory Commission (EAC), relying more on a small 
group of aids in the Executive Branch and personal friends.66 His list of trusted foreign 
policy consultants and advisors, including Henry Morgenthau, Harry Hopkins, General 
Marshall, and his Chief of Staff Admiral Leahy, was short.67 The insulated policy 
generating environment created by the president left US planners and inter-allied 
negotiators in a state of paralysis. 
In 1944 and early 1945 the White House managed all the central threads of 
German occupation planning. Implementation of policy was difficult because from the 
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start of the war many of Roosevelt’s positions were either unknown or unclear to those 
who had to execute them.68 He frequently had left the State Department uninformed on 
major foreign policy matters. For example, in 1933, Roosevelt decided to recognize the 
USSR without consulting the State Department; in 1943, Hull was not allowed to see any 
of the conference notes from the Teheran Conference; and in 1944, at the Second Quebec 
Conference, Roosevelt decided unilaterally that the Morgenthau Plan would be official 
US postwar policy.69 After September 1944, the president had ostracized the State 
Department to such an extent that any further policy rearguing Germany had to be cleared 
with the Treasury Department.70 During this dark period, in the face of overwhelming 
alienation, the State Department did not change its policy pursuits but did their best to 
work from lower levels to influence the development of the directive.  
It had been decided, at the Moscow Conference in 1943, to establish the European 
Advisory Commission as the proper body to carry out negotiations over postwar German 
matters. On several occasions during the tenure of the EAC; the negotiators were ready to 
form a policy, but the White House held them at a standstill. Even though both the British 
Foreign Office and the US State Department were in complete support of EAC 
negotiations, it seemed conclusive that the president did not respect the policy-making 
qualifications of the EAC.71  As late as October 1944, the president reported to Hull that 
it was not advisable for the United States to make plans for a country that they did not yet 
occupy. Also, the president advised Hull not to give any weight to the negotiations taking 
place with our principal Allies. He reminded Hull that the purpose of the EAC was 
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“Advisory” and they are not bound by their recommendations.72 This was Roosevelt’s 
leadership style. He would make important decisions with a few close aids and preferred 
to delay all decisions as long as possible. He rarely read or followed the advisement of 
State Department memoranda, despite having no training in these difficult matters.73 The 
president’s style and attitude had an adverse effect on how the Soviets and the British 
approached the occupation. The postponement of major decisions had an undesirable 
effect on postwar cooperation and was expected to have a detrimental effect on the 
reconstruction of the German economy.   
Roosevelt had only a passing interest in multilateralism. His postwar interests 
were more selective than that of the State Department. His advocacy for free and equal 
trade varied by circumstance.74 His main foreign policy agenda was dominated by a large 
deference for the welfare of the British people. When it came to Hull’s principle on free 
and unrestricted trade for all, including Great Britain and Germany, the president did not 
agree. Great Britain would be allowed to keep its Imperial trading system, while 
Germany’s industrial trade would have to be diminished.75 Roosevelt’s policy of picking 
winners like Britain and losers like Germany for the postwar world was in direct conflict 
with the multilateral principles laid down by the State Department. 
It was predicable that the chaotic policy advanced by Roosevelt and Morgenthau 
would lead to the collapse of the German economy and possibly much of Europe. Poor 
planning would lead to a drain on US taxpayers and the potential starvation of thousands 
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of Germans.76 This was the exact situation that State Department planners had been 
working to avoid since 1939. Hull, Pasvolsky, Welles, and Bowman, despite their 
individual feelings about Germans, believed that the opportunity for the United States at 
the end of WWII should be used to do more than to just settle accounts.   
 
JCS1067 and a Period of Deficient Planning 
The end product of Roosevelt and Morgenthau’s punitive treatment for Germany 
was the military directive JCS1067. As E.F. Penrose stated, “It was President Roosevelt’s 
failure to adjudicate decisively between incompatible views among his Cabinet officers 
that led to a “compromise” drawn up at “lower levels” which permitted large parts of the 
Morgenthau Plan to creep in.”77 The process of writing JCS1067 was started in the fall of 
1944 after the Second Quebec Conference, and over the next six months it went through a 
series of revisions until it was given to US Occupation Commander in Germany General 
Lucius D. Clay on April 26 1945.78 On that date, German deindustrialization and 
economic chaos became official US occupation policy.  
On November 30, 1944, Hull resigned as Secretary of State, succeeded by 
Edward Stettinius, Jr. Because of Hull’s retirement, the State Department was at a 
significant disadvantage during the process of creating JCS1067. Despite the change at 
State Department, officials did what they could to weaken the overall concept of the 
Morgenthau Plan. Alternatives offered to the text of the directive were subtle but 
crucially different. McCloy, who worked in conjunction with the State and Treasury 
Departments, finally settled for language that called for military control of the economy 
                                                 
76 Dietrich, The Morgenthau Plan Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy, 88. 
77 Penrose, Economic Planning for the Peace, 294. 
78 Petrov, Money and Conquest; Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II., 166. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
102
 
while taking no steps toward rehabilitation. 79 The wording may not have been favorable 
to the State Department, but at least those at the War Department in charge of the 
occupation were not in favor of destroying the German industry and had given 
themselves enough flexibility room to maneuver.  
Roosevelt and Morgenthau had hoped that the new directive could be applied to 
all of Germany, but after it was presented at the EAC in spring of 1945, it was rejected by 
Britain and the Soviets. As early as September of 1944, Dr. Pasvolsky was told by A.A. 
Sobolev, Vice Chairman of the Soviet delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 
that “Mr. Morgenthau’s type of thinking was not acceptable to the Soviet Government.”80 
At this time, both the United States and the Soviets had hopes of a united Germany under 
their particular influence. Although in 1945 Soviet policy was not clear to the United 
States, it should have been obvious that during the occupation, the Soviets could use 
JCS1067 against the United States to gain support among the German people.   
Despite the outcome of the Second Quebec Conference, the British also refused to 
accept JCS1067 as a combined Anglo-American policy. In a memorandum prepared by 
the Acting Secretary of State Stettinius on November 29, 1944, it was noted, “British 
officials seem strongly opposed to sweeping measures of de-industrialization and extreme 
impoverishment of Germany.”81 The British developed their own liberal directive 
intending to preserve the basic structure of the German economy, a policy for which 
Morgenthau severely criticized British officials.82 The British government was not in 
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support of a punitive treatment for postwar Germany. The deal made between Churchill 
and Roosevelt at Quebec was quickly rejected by London.83 
As JCS1067 became available in the spring of 1945, the new president, Harry S. 
Truman, supported Stimson and gave the military full authority to run the German 
occupation. In April 1945, the final draft directive seemed much better to Stimson than 
the earlier drafts. It did not approve action to strengthen the German economy but at least 
it did not call for its destruction. McCloy made sure that the style of phrasing used would 
give the military enough latitude and escape clauses to administer the occupation, as they 
deemed necessary.84 The final version of JCS1067 was opposed by the State Department 
and signified a policy victory for the Treasury Department. Morgenthau was happy with 
JCS1067, later commenting that it included all the essential elements of the Morgenthau 
Plan.85 With the Truman administration reliance on the War Department while trying to 
gain control of the situation, the State Department under the new direction of Edward 
Stettinius, Jr., was further removed from having significant influence over occupation 
policy during the early days of postwar Germany.  
JCS1067 was eventually abandoned as a policy in 1947. The directive was a 
poorly conceived policy based on revenge. Lewis Douglas, appointed as economic 
advisor to General Clay in April 1944, when first reading the directive was quoted, “This 
thing was assembled by economic idiots”86 Douglas believed that the policy stipulated in 
JCS1067 was unworkable in occupied Germany. His first assignment was to fly back to 
Washington to try to get JSC1067 replaced. He was unsuccessful and, as a consequence, 
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resigned his position. The implementation of Morgenthau’s policy built into JCS1067 at 
the start the postwar German occupation was a tragedy. It dragged all of Europe down, 
cost US taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, financed Soviets reparation removals 
from Germany at the expense of the United States, and caused needless starvation and 
poverty. 
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Chapter IV 
1945–1948: The Occupation Period 
Redressing US Occupation Policy 
The occupation of Germany was a period marked by changing policies. Despite 
starting out as punitive, occupation policy gradually evolved to promote economic 
prosperity. The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 was similar to the JCS1067 directive 
drafted earlier that year; both projected a get-tough attitude. However, by 1947, the 
United States was transitioning to a program of promoting prosperity, a policy position 
similar to what was proposed by early postwar planners from the State Department. This 
was not true of all policy issues. All US policy positions were critical of German 
industrial cartels; therefore, policy toward cartels started out restrictive and remained that 
way throughout the occupation period. When it came to policy addressing reparation 
payments, industrial output, and separation of the Ruhr, US policy started out harsh and 
moderated over time by limiting reparations, increasing industrial output, and opposing 
separation of the Ruhr. Policy regarding the partition of Germany became more 
complicated. Initially, the US Treasury Department favored the partition of Germany, 
whereas the State Department was strongly opposed to partition. Over time, the State 
Department increasingly found itself in support of partition, a change that would lead to 
the eventual division of Germany. It did so to promote multilateral economic prosperity 
in the part of Germany that was under the control of the United States. On every issue, 
the eventual policy outcome was one that intended to maximize the implementation of a 
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multilateral economic system in Germany along the lines of what was recommended by 
the early State Department planners. 
The central dilemma faced by the United States at the start of the occupation 
period was that a potentially high-powered German industrial economy was both the 
problem and the solution to postwar problems. At the end of WWII, there was a 
legitimate concern that a dominant German industrial economy could again threaten 
Europe. Official US policy linked peace and security with a crippled Germany. Many, 
including those at the US State Department, recognized that a prosperous Europe could 
be a peaceful Europe and that prosperity would depend on a strong German industrial 
base. Various US governmental agencies struggled with both sides of this dilemma, 
causing a bifurcated policy approach to be applied to Germany during the early 
occupation period. While a punitive Potsdam agreement was officially in place, the US 
War and State Departments increasingly implemented policy that would serve to revive 
the German economy. As time went on, most US governmental departments were 
increasingly sidestepping the application of official US policy. 
The endorsement of JCS1067 in the first half of 1945 and the negotiations at the 
Potsdam Conference by the Truman administration in the summer of 1945 overlooked the 
importance of the German industrial economy to both the world and Europe. It was 
unrealistic for US officials to think that the dynamic engine of German industry could be 
either ignored or dismantled and sent to other European nations. During most of the 
previous century, Germany played a central role in the European market. Throughout the 
1920s, Germany was the leading consumer for goods produced by Italy and Switzerland, 
the second best consumer for goods produced by Denmark, Holland, and the British Isles, 
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and the third best consumer for goods produced by the United States. In the 1920s, the 
United States exported more goods to pre-Nazi Germany than to all South American 
nations combined.1 The State Department recognized that the US get-tough policy 
underestimated Germany’s position in world markets. The historical scope of German 
participation in the international economy was too important to be eliminated. 
A key point argued by early postwar planners at the State Department was that a modern 
prosperous world economy was multilateral in nature. JCS1067 and the Potsdam 
Agreement disregarded this principle, ignoring the interconnectedness of German 
industry both inside Germany and throughout the European continent. The 
implementation of these two plans effectively cut off European trade from German coal 
production and machine building industries; this severely limited the possibility of using 
German trade to help rebuild the European economy.2 The division of Germany into 
occupation zones by the Allies also crippled the movement of trade. US State Department 
briefing papers created for the Potsdam Conference repeatedly warned of the serious 
consequences if the German economy was not managed as a single economic unit.3 These 
warnings were not taken seriously as the separation of Germany into four separate 
occupation zones served to limited commercial activity. The German national economy, 
which had been interdependent, was now divided and disconnected by four differing 
occupational policies.  
In 1945, at the start of the occupation, the US State Department had to take a 
backseat to the War Department and the Executive Branch on policy matters concerning 
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the German occupation. This was the case for a variety of reasons. First, there were 
changes in leadership at the top levels of the US government. A new Secretary of State, 
James F. Byrnes, was sworn into office in July 1945, and the Truman Administration, 
which had been in office only a few months, was still trying to assert itself. Second, there 
was already a strong military presence in place in Germany asserting its own agenda. 
Finally, the State Department had just lost its interdepartmental struggle with the US 
Treasury and Executive branches. These circumstances put the State Department in a 
temporary position of weakness.4 This turned out to be a short-term setback, as State 
Department policies gradually became more influential over the next two years. This 
reversal occurred in three ways. First, over time, both the military personnel in Germany 
and Executive Department officials in Washington were changing policy 
recommendations to align closer to what the State Department had been advocating. 
Second, State Department officials increasingly gained more direct responsibility for the 
occupation. Finally, there was a change in the nature of the occupation as the focus of 
policy on Germany changed from an interdepartmental disagreement within the US 
government to an external struggle between the United States and its former Allies. This 
change in the nature of the disagreement necessitated the United States to readjust its 
policy closer to State Department recommendations. 
By the start of the occupation, US State Department officials had spent a number 
of years planning for the postwar period. They had anticipated major problems that other 
US Government officials had not foreseen. Before JCS1067 and the Potsdam Conference, 
they warned of a critical need for coal in Europe and expressed concerns that Germany 
would be in a crisis condition if it was not be operated as a single economic unit. This 
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was evident in policy briefing papers generated by the State Department for the Potsdam 
Conference in July 1945.5 These documents pointed out that an adequate distribution of 
coal was of key importance to all European countries. An acute shortage would be the 
most important obstacle to economic recovery. Briefing papers recommended that a 
maximum effort must be made to resolve the German coal problem as soon as possible.6 
This documentation recommended that from 1945–1946, both German and Polish 
production facilities would need to get back on schedule quickly to meet the continent’s 
minimum needs. Four critical areas would need immediate and concurrent attention: 
increased coal production, the revival of coal transportation, an increase in the general 
level of the economy, and the nation-wide integration of the German coal industry.7 
Briefing papers written for the Potsdam Conference detailed a knowledgeable 
understanding by the US State Department of imminent problems that would be faced 
during the occupation. They were remarkably consistent with multilateral policy plans 
developed by the early planners at the State Department. While confirming that the needs 
of Allied nations take precedence over the needs of Germany, they understood that the 
general level of the entire German economy must be increased concurrently for all of 
Europe to recover. 
State Department Policy Briefing papers expressed concern over the possibility 
that the occupation zones would act independently. They stressed that Germany must 
operate as a single economic unit: “The division of Germany into zones of occupation 
does not imply in the erection of barriers to the inter-zonal movement of goods.”8 The 
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State Department warned that the operation of the zones as closed economic entities 
would be utterly impracticable. In general, the US zone needed food, industrial materials, 
and coal; the British zone needed food, but had an excess of coal and industrial materials; 
and the Russian zone had an excess of food and coal.9 By the summer of 1945, the matter 
of a unified Germany had not yet been raised by the Soviet Union, with the exception of 
reparations. It had been evident since the Tehran Conference in December 1943 that a 
main objective for the Soviets was a large reparations settlement. The operation of 
Germany as a single economic unit could not be broached with the Soviets until they 
received a suitable reparations deal.10 By June 1945, the Soviets had already taken large 
quantities of reparations from their zone and were stalling further negotiations for the 
economic unity of Germany until a suitable settlement was reached over reparation 
removals from the Western zones. 
At the start of the occupation period, critical policy decisions had been delayed, 
and the possibility of a coal shortage and the economic partition of Germany was already 
a concern at the State Department. Matters had already been delayed as a result of the US 
interdepartmental disagreement over postwar policy. It appeared that a roadblock over a 
Soviet reparations agreement was going to cause a further delay on important policy 
decisions.11 Issues necessary for a viable German economy, such as the freedom of 
movement, rebuilding a national transportation system, uniform ration scale, uniform 
industrial and agricultural policies, centralized currency, and a national import-export 
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agreement, had not yet been considered.12 As early as June 1945, State Department 
briefing papers expressed apprehension about the urgency of these matters and further 
delay would lead to economic partition. For the first time, the State Department 
considered the possibility that an agreement with the Soviets might not be reached. The 
urgency of these problems required the need for prompt decisions, even if it meant the 
exclusion of the Soviets. Even before the Potsdam Conference, the State Department felt 
that it would soon become necessary to make arrangements with other Allies, limiting 
policy application to only the US and British zones.13 There was still hope that the 
upcoming Potsdam Conference would address these issues, but the time was fast 
approaching in which the Western Allies would have to act to unify economic activity 
exclusively in their own Western zones to avert chaos and disorder. 
There was a window of opportunity early in the occupation to solve these matters. 
In the late spring and early summer of 1945, there was a great amount of goodwill toward 
the Russians, and the attitude of the American people toward the Soviets at the time of 
surrender was overwhelmingly optimistic. Many Americans felt that as a result of the 
common cause and suffering, the two nations would come to agreement over the future of 
Europe. Byrnes believed that at the end of the war, peace would be so deeply desired that 
the Allies would have little difficulty in resolving European issues. The United States had 
concerns over Soviet policy in Poland and Romania, but there was optimism that these 
problems could be worked out.14 Despite concerns over the slow pace of negotiations, the 
State Department felt positive that it might not be too late for cooperation on Germany. 
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Although officials at the State Department were the last US governmental agency 
to lose hope in coming to an agreement with the Soviets, their feelings of optimism 
turned out to be unrealistic. By early summer of 1945, problems were already starting to 
develop. The State Department was not immune from criticism; it had been planning for 
the long term and did not devote enough attention to short-term planning; the official 
punitive policy in place made for a difficult start to the occupation. The authorities in 
Washington who prepared JCS1067 did not grasp the realities of conditions in postwar 
Germany. The initial problem was not that JCS1067 promoted a hard peace over a soft 
peace; the problem was that conditions on the ground were much more challenging than 
expected. State Department policy focused on trying to determine the exact level of 
industry necessary to fit the German economy in its proper place among European 
nations during normal times. The real focus should have been on preparing the economy 
to recover as fast as possible in order to avoid a near-term economic disaster. JCS1067 
called for the German economy to be controlled by the US military to only the extent 
necessary to meet the needs of occupation forces and to prevent disease and unrest. The 
directive gave limited authority to the Military government and prohibited any steps 
being taken to rehabilitate or maintain the German economy.15 General Clay was blocked 
from taking action on two fronts: (1) the restrictive nature of JCS1067 and (2) the Allied 
occupational structure set up to run postwar Germany, the Allied Control Council (ACC), 
called for a unanimous vote before any action could be taken.16 A single veto by any 
Ally, British, Soviet, or French, could put a stop to any policy in Germany. Clay, who felt 
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unable to intervene, understood that thousands of Germans would starve unless 
immediate action was taken to revive industrial production.  
After the first troubled year of occupation, Clay directed the US military to 
produce the publication A Year of Potsdam, The German Economy Since the Surrender.17 
In this publication, Clay was critical of how the Potsdam Agreement was harmful to the 
postwar occupation of Germany. Much of the Morgenthau spirit survived after he left the 
Treasury Department and had been written into the Potsdam Agreement.18 Potsdam 
policy was aimed at destroying Germany’s import-export system by the use of industrial 
restrictions and by overzealous reparation removals. In a response to this problem, the 
publication was used by US military officials to argue that Germany had always been 
heavily dependent on imports and its economy based on a system of combining German 
labor with imported raw materials to manufacture finished machinery and metals. The 
end of WWII had brought on a complex problem of reviving foreign trade in a defeated 
and bankrupt nation. The removal of capital equipment had been targeted at Germany’s 
most productive industries. If its traditional heavy industrial base were to be destroyed, it 
would end Germany’s ability to become self-sufficient.19 The War Department was 
looking to free itself from the restrictions of JCS1067 and the Potsdam Agreement. With 
the use of this publication, Clay was seeking unrestricted authority to revive the German 
economy to the fullest extent. This would serve to make the military’s job easier, reduce 
the burden on US taxpayers, and allow Germany democratic forces an easier time in 
resisting Soviet influence. The policy position of Clay and the US military was different 
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than the policy position of the State Department.20 The State Department was in favor of 
a revival only to a certain degree, to be used for the purpose of rebuilding all the nations 
of Europe, a multilateral prosperity for victors and vanquished alike. 
Changes in US policy between 1945 and 1947 were gradual. Even though 
Morgenthau resigned from the Treasury in the summer of 1945, vestiges of the 
Treasury’s putative influence remained strong among the lower ranks for the first two 
years of occupation.21 Reparation policy during the early occupation period was still 
operating under the shadow of a Morgenthau-type de-industrialization. It was not until 
the folly of trying to run a balanced German economy while shipping off German 
industrial capital to the Soviets that the punitive policy was perceived as a serious 
mistake. When faced with what appeared to be a complete collapse of the German 
economy, many occupation officials who started out determined to destroy Germany’s 
industrial capacity steadily evolved into advocates of economic recovery.22 By 1946, 
State Department officials and the US military started to work for solutions. In April 
1946, Clay made the first bold move by stopping all dismantling of German industry for 
shipment to the Soviets.23 Then he used his influence to change the structure of British 
coal production in the Ruhr. Whereas both the United States and Britain agreed that more 
German coal was urgently needed to revive the European economy, they differed on how 
the Ruhr coal production should be administered. The British insisted that the Ruhr be 
nationalized, while US officials held that coal mines would operate more productively if 
they remained under private ownership and were run by experienced German executives. 
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A decision was made on September 10, 1946 in favor of Clay’s position; the Ruhr’s coal 
industry would not be nationalized but returned to German management as a means to 
boost output.24 The change to German management and control was done to maximize 
coal production in the Ruhr. By 1946, the need to change policy was driven more by 
economic urgency than by political objectives. 
By 1947, it became evident to the State Department that the United States had 
grossly underestimated the destruction of the European economy by the war. “We failed 
to take fully into account the effects of economic dislocation on production-
nationalization of industries, drastic land reform, severance of long-standing commercial 
ties, disappearance of private commercial firms through death or loss of capital.”25 
Europe was steadily deteriorating; by 1947, malnutrition had peaked, and millions of 
people in German cities were slowly starving.26 The modern division of labor system in 
Europe had broken down. Nations were still running continual deficits. In 1946, the 
United Kingdom had a balance of payments deficit of 2¼ billion, France 1¼ billion, Italy 
½ billion, and in the US occupied German zone ½ billion.27 It had been two years since 
the end of the war and a corner had not yet been turned. Economies in Europe were 
deteriorating, and the hope of reassembling a multilateral trade system among nations had 
not yet been realized.  
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Eliminating German Cartels 
Before multilateral foreign trade could be restarted, the problem of controlling 
German industry had to be solved. German industry was not going to be allowed to 
become the master of the Europe continent. To varying degrees, the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviets all believed that the social structure of industry in Germany was 
the major cause of economic aggression.28 The persistent power of German elites and the 
monopoly capitalists had the retarded the nations democratic development. The problem 
accelerated after WWI as control of the German economy became increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of a few people. This went beyond just the means of production 
ownership; the structure in Germany involved a collaborative and cohesive economic 
empire, a nefarious partnership of private business and a militaristic government.29 The 
United States was of one mind on this point, the concentrated structure of the German 
economy was inconsistent with the future of peace and democracy, and the job of the 
occupation forces was to disassemble that structure.   
Large industrial firms were a primary target of the occupation; the larger the firm, 
the more intense the scrutiny.30 German cartels were a particular concern because of their 
horizontal control of broad markets. All branches of the US government stood firm and 
unanimous against this form of market control. The United States held a unique view on 
industrial concentration. Unlike the British and the Soviets who accepted the usefulness 
of large blocks of economic concentration for use as agents of social reform, the United 
States worked to reduce all institutions of economic concentration for the prerequisite of 
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promoting competition.31 All US occupation policymakers agreed on this particular issue. 
Large concentrations of economic power were to be broken up, and all cartels and cartel-
like organizations were to be disbanded.32 Postwar Germany was to be decentralized by 
the elimination of excess concentration of economic power comprised of cartels, trusts, 
and monopolies.   
US officials did not view cartels as dynamic and efficient; they viewed them as 
archaic. Cartels blocked the diffusion of efficient technologies, stifled innovation, and 
created a dangerous authoritarian power structure within the economy.33 They eliminated 
horizontal diversification and limited the ability of market forces to work the benefit of 
the general public. Cartels catered production to the needs of the elite; their elimination 
would go a long way to change the structure of the German economy. Through the 
process of decartelization, German capitalism could be restructured to resemble US 
capitalism, the mass production of standardized goods for mass distribution. US policy 
was predicated on the establishment of an egalitarian economy as a necessary step toward 
a more democratic German society. 
There were two different ways in which US policy makers viewed the relevance 
of German industry; some felt that because of its centralized and monopolistic nature, 
German industry was artificial and not vital to Europe. The Potsdam Agreement, which 
had little input from the State Department, was based on this presumption. The claim of 
“artificial” was based on the belief that the strength of German industry was due to the 
exclusion of foreign competition by the use of import duties and its prominence inflated 
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by use of political coercion.34 The economic rationale behind the Potsdam Agreement 
argued that the breakdown of the international economic system during the 1930s was 
due to a coercive German industrial structure that dominated the European market. In a 
free and competitive economy, German industry would not be able to compete. The 
Potsdam agreement called for this industrial structure to be disassembled and relocated 
elsewhere in Europe.  
Other policy makers like those in the US State Department believed that German 
industry held a vital place in the European economy and was essential to its prosperity. 
Germany’s central position in Europe, its excellent railway network, communication 
systems, and strong domestic markets made it naturally strong and competitive. When 
you add its coal resources, rivers and canals, and the industrial skills developed during 
the last few generations you have all the essential ingredients for a vibrant economy.35 
US officials at the State Department who held this view believed that Germany should be 
reorganized, not dismantled. They believed that the German industrial system was the 
center around which the European system moved.36 In short, remove the cancer (cartels), 
and the patient (Germany) could be saved. 
In the summer of 1945, the United States launched a rigorous attack on German 
cartels.37 Paragraph 12 of the Potsdam Declaration stated that the German economy 
would be decentralized to eliminate excessive concentrations of economic power held by 
cartels, trusts, and monopolies.38 I.G. Farben, the world’s largest chemical company and 
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Hitler’s major producer of war material, known as a “State within a State,” was forced 
out of existence. US occupation officials took control of 42 of its manufacturing plants, 
dissolved the firm, and then reorganized it into 52 independent operations. By 1946, 
occupation forces had terminated 1,000 cartel and restrictive trade practices. 
Decartelization policy remained a priority throughout the occupation period. The criteria 
used to define a firm as a cartel were based on its number of employees. Law 56, passed 
by US occupation forces in February 1947, required any firm headquartered in the US 
zone having over 10,000 employees be deconcentrated unless given a specific exemption 
by the military government. A similar law was concurrently enacted in the British zone.39 
Some other firms that were broken up included major Ruhr steel producers, like Vestag 
and Krupp, and the six largest banks, including Deutsche, Dresdner, and Commerz 
Banks.40  
There was a great expectation on the part of US officials that decartelization 
would be a major feature in the reorganization of the German economy. All sides in the 
US policy debate were in favor of this policy. The United States had a recent history of 
trust-busting legislation; it was seen as a necessary historical process that German 
capitalism had not gone through yet. Evidence of this deeply held conviction could be 
seen in a report issued in the summer of 1945 by the US Senate Committee on War 
Mobilization. They were investigating the possibility that German conspirators were 
attempting to create economic reserves inside and outside Germany for another attempt at 
world conquest. The committee was concerned that if Germany was not changed, they 
would soon start WWIII. The committee’s final recommendation was that pressure be put 
                                                 
39 Clay, Decision in Germany, 326. 
40 Zeitlin, Americanization and Its Limits, 363. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
120
 
on US occupation forces to thoroughly complete the decartelization of the German 
economy.41 The conviction of the committee that cartels were a prime force behind Nazi 
aggression and that a systematic removal of industrial cartels would ensure the peace is 
an example of how firmly US officials held this view. 
Germany Moves Toward a Crisis  
At the start of the occupation period, the foreign policy apparatus of the United 
States was adrift. President Truman was inexperienced in foreign affairs, Byrnes was 
essentially a domestic politician, and there was an unsettled departmental disagreement 
that carried over from the Roosevelt administration. There was no one document or paper 
that spelled out a comprehensive policy toward Germany. There was no one leader, like 
Stalin for the Soviets, who dominated national policy decisions. Byrnes was not a 
forceful leader, he believed that the State Department should limit itself strictly to 
policymaking and not become involved in the control of occupational organizations. 
Byrnes was willing to let the State Department stand back from the occupation; the State 
Department would recommend policy, the president would determine policy, and the War 
and Navy Departments would execute policy.42 This was a responsibility that many in the 
military were reluctant to take, and those who did accept responsibility, like Clay, had 
their own ideas on how to run the German occupation. The second level of the State 
Department was comprised of a new group of officials who were committed to taking up 
the ideals of the early postwar planners. Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, 
Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman, and Reparations Ambassador Edwin Pauley 
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all believed in the primacy of economic policy and the multilateral ideal.43 As the 
occupation continued, this group of officials became more influential and pushed US 
policy toward a multilateral promotion of German prosperity. 
When Clay left Washington on April 6, 1945 to take over command of the 
German occupation, he was not given any State Department briefings or policy papers to 
review.44 He did not receive a copy of JCS1067 until after he arrived in Germany. This 
lack of policy briefing was not of great concern to Clay; he found the conditions on the 
ground in Germany so bad that short-term directives and long-term policy would take a 
backseat to immediate relief. The situation in Germany was unprecedented, Assistant 
Secretary of War John McCloy referred to it as “The most complete economic and 
political collapse in modern times.”45 From the military’s perspective, the responsibility 
to carry out short-term policy, namely JCS1067, in itself was unrealistic. In the face of 
the destruction of war, just keeping the situation from degrading into chaos would be 
difficult. For the military officials in charge of the day-to-day operations, long-term goals 
were irrelevant and short-term planning was inadequate.  
Cooperation between the Military and the State Departments in Germany got off 
to a slow start. Because of the need for immediate action, Clay and the military drifted 
toward a unilateral policy to keep the US zone afloat. Over time, Clay continued to 
practice a wide range of decision-making latitude to allow the military occupation to 
sustain. During the first two years of occupation, a number of decisions were made to 
improve the overall economic situation in Germany; however, some came at the expense 
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of other European nations. Clay’s unilateral action was starting to become a problem; it 
was at odds with long-term State Department policy, which was based on the concept that 
before any action was taken in Germany, it should first be considered for its effects on 
the whole of Europe. By 1947, the State Department began to reassert itself. They urged 
that policy should be directed to the creation of an all-European economic organization 
designed to accelerate the lagging reconstruction and to achieve a greater long-run 
economic unity in Europe.46 Policy from 1945 to 1947 was in a constant state of 
transition. Clay and the military were developing unilateral decisions to promote a 
successful occupation. Meanwhile, as the State Department began to regain its influence, 
it began working toward the long-term goal of rebuilding Europe as an integrated whole.  
During the first two years of the occupation, US policy for Germany was 
bifurcated for a number of reasons. First, while Clay and the military were implementing 
short-term policy for reconstructing the German economy, the State Department was 
interested in changing the nature of the slow-moving German recovery from unilateral to 
multilateral. Second, the State Department was still trying to work with the Soviets to 
unify Germany; a consequence of this strategy was the willingness by the State 
Department to delay the full recovery of the German economy until unification could be 
achieved.47 Third, the long-term goal of redeveloping the international commercial 
system on an egalitarian basis preempted any notion of a speedy recovery for Germany.48 
Finally, there was pressure by Congress to bring the troops home and cut occupational 
expenses. Roosevelt had told Stalin in 1944 that the United States would only leave 
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troops in Europe for two years. The Truman administration, also very concerned about 
finances, was apprehensive about providing financial support for the US occupation zone 
while sending reparations to the Soviets.49 Clay was well aware of these feelings in 
Washington and, consequently, one of his paramount concerns was to make Germany 
self-sufficient to keep costs down to US taxpayers and permit a timely American 
withdrawal. By 1947, a crisis was developing in Germany, one that would unify US 
policy under the guidance of the State Department.  
1947 was a turning point for the occupation of Germany. The winter of  
1946–1947 had been the worst in decades; it was a time of crisis as the German people 
were running out of coal and food. Both the military occupational authorities and the 
State Department recognized that mistakes had been made. The United States had to 
reverse course and save as much of Germany as possible.50 Coal and food production 
needed to be increased, industrial production needed to be expanded to help pay for 
imports, and a new policy would have to be developed to save the Western zones, even if 
it meant the partition of Germany. The State Department was forced to reevaluate its 
broad stance for European redevelopment and focus on economic development for 
Germany. This change can be identified by changes in policy toward the control of the 
Ruhr, reparation deliveries to the Soviets, and the level of German industrial production. 
The hardening of US policy in relation to these issues was bound to cause problems 
during the ongoing negotiations with the Soviets. 
The major difficulty for the occupation was doing business with the Soviets who 
were antagonistic to multilateral economic policy. At the start of the occupation, State 
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Department policy anticipated cooperation with the Soviets on trade. In July 1945, 
Byrnes stated, “It is of course a prime objective of this Government to include the Soviets 
in any organization having to do with production, export, or allocation of German coal.”51 
Coal was the prime concern for the economy and the United States was eager to trade for 
Soviet zone coal. However, after two years, no progress had been made, and as a result, 
the United States was losing its willingness to negotiate. By 1947, Byrnes’ comments on 
Soviet cooperation had completely reversed: “They want to share in all decisions on the 
allocation of Ruhr products. Our experience on the Allied Control Council demonstrates 
how impractical this proposal is.”52  By 1947, the Soviets felt they had been betrayed by 
the United States on reparation deliveries from the Western zones; they were not going to 
negotiate free trade for Germany until they received a suitable reparations agreement. 
The United States was committed to not giving in to reparations until there was free trade 
in all of Germany. An impasse had been reached in negotiations; if the Soviets would not 
supply coal from East Germany, they could not expect to have any control over the 
industrial production from the Ruhr. 
The United States’ inability to open up all of Germany to free trade led directly to 
a change in policy on sending the Soviets reparations. This change had a longstanding 
impact on the future of Germany and increased the level of tension between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. At Potsdam, the United States had agreed to send the 
Soviets 10 percent of the industrial capacity of the Western zone within two years, 
assuming a united German economic system. After nine months and no Soviet 
cooperation on trade, Clay took a hard stand by designating that until the Soviets opened 
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up trade with the East, there would be no reparations from the West.53 The position was 
firm. The United States would not pay for reparations again as it had after WWI. German 
capital equipment could not be given to the Soviets while the American taxpayer was 
paying for the support of the US zone. The United States then implemented the “First 
Charge Principle,” meaning that proceeds from exports of current production would first 
go to pay for needed imports, not to pay for Soviet claims.54 It was possible that the 
United States may have to finance German reconstruction in its own zone, but it would 
not pay for reconstruction in the Soviet zone. To save the Western zones of Germany, the 
United States would have to divide it from the Eastern zone. Division was not the initial 
desire of anyone at the State Department, but if the Soviets would not allow Germany to 
integrate as one economic unit, then the United States would have no option but to 
integrate a separate West Germany economy exclusively with other Western economies.  
As the occupation preceded, it became clearer to the State Department that plans 
to keep the German economy at a managed level of production were unworkable. State 
Department documents from before 1947 advocated for a moderately prosperous German 
economy, but accommodated the concerns of other nations over the potential of a 
renewed German threat by limiting German industrial production. However, by 1947, 
there was no longer a concern for a German threat; therefore, there was no need to restrict 
German industrial production. Briefing papers were calling for urgent action to increase 
the production of coal, food, and consumer goods.55 The United States were calling for an 
increase in the German standard of living equal to their European neighbors as a 
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necessity for the development of a prosperous and democratic Germany.56 As hopes for a 
multilateral vision for all of Europe ran into Soviet resistance, the United States had to 
retool its policy to restart the German industrial machine to benefit a stagnate Western 
European economy.  
Policy concerning the control of the Ruhr was the subject of intense negotiation 
during the occupation period. In 1945, the French and some US officials wanted the Ruhr 
to be separated from the rest of Germany. Others, including the Soviets recommended 
that it be turned over to international ownership.57 Other forms of control over the Ruhr 
were being discussed. Both Clay and officials at the State Department contended that 
Germany without the Ruhr could not be self-sustaining and that detachment would be 
contrary to the political and economic stability of Europe. US officials also believed that 
the population of the Ruhr would most likely be agitated until it was reunited with 
Germany.58 By 1947, the United States had ruled out both the separation of the Ruhr 
from Germany and international ownership, but it did call for international supervision of 
the Ruhr resources to ensure equal access to all nations.  
 By the fall of 1947, the US State Department realized that early occupation 
policy designed to force the Soviets to accede to cooperation in Germany by withholding 
payments of reparations, denying Soviet control over resources from the Ruhr, or 
manipulating the level of industrial production, had failed. The result was the separation 
of the Soviet zone from the US, British, and French zones.59 If the Soviets continued to 
oppose multilateralism, they would do so under economic handicap of exclusion from the 
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Western European market. Conversely, the United States was willing to use its superior 
economic position to support Germany and other European nations willing to include 
their economies in a multilateral system. The State Department was the last US 
Department to give up hope for a united Germany, but once they realized they could not 
coerce the Soviets into multilateral participation in Germany, it was time to cut loose 
from the negotiations.  
US Policy and the Division of Germany 
At the start of the occupation, the US State Department advised against the 
partition of Germany.60 State Department briefing papers issued in July 1944 for the 
Potsdam Conference recommended that the United States should strongly oppose the 
partition of Germany. There were many reasons given: partition would break up 
Germany as an economic unity, it would be dangerous to the future peace in Europe, the 
current occupation zones would not work as plausible partition lines, and partition would 
have to be maintained by force. The State Department asserted that the Germans had 
become increasingly homogenous and would try to reunite. Most importantly, partition 
would be injurious to the rehabilitation of Europe and cause further expense for the 
United States.61 The Soviets were also interested in the possibility of a united Germany; 
they had hopes of fostering Soviet influence over the entire country. Soviet promised that 
cooperation would be forthcoming if they would receive continued reparations payments 
from the Western zones and had access to a share of recourses from the Ruhr. Only in 
1948 did the Soviets finally abandon the idea of a united Germany.62 At a speech given in 
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Stuttgart in September 1946, Byrnes restated future policy toward Germany, “The United 
States shall do everything in its power to secure the maximum possible unification.”63 
Even though Clay had stopped reparations deliveries to the Soviets in the spring of 1946, 
it was not done with the intension of dividing Germany. It was an action taken by US 
military officials to improve conditions in the western zone. As of 1946, the US military 
was still determined to make cooperation with the Soviets work.64 It was in the last half 
of 1946 that policy changed from cooperation to obstruction and hopes for a united 
Germany started to unwind. 
There is much debate as to who was responsible for the division of Germany, but 
it seems clear that reparations were at the heart of the issue. Both sides were unsure of the 
other’s intentions. Both sides started the occupation with high hopes of a united Germany 
under the auspices of their own particular influences. The Russians placed a tremendous 
value on Communist success in Germany.65 They believed that a postwar Germany was 
predisposed to become a communist nation, especially if the Soviets were in a position to 
influence local officials. The United States was determined that Germany should be part 
of a US lead multilateral group of capitalist nations. Some level of socialism would be 
acceptable, but national trade policy was to be open and free. The first priority for the 
Soviets was reparations, and until they received a suitable agreement, they would insist 
on a separation of zones. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson believed that the 
Soviets were playing a waiting game; they would keep a firm control over the Eastern 
zone until a time came when the United States pulled out, and then a united Germany 
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under Soviet influence would become a possibility.66 There seemed to be no solution to 
the US-Soviet deadlock. 
The Soviets and the United States were not the only foreign powers with concerns 
about the German settlement. State Department preparation papers for the Moscow 
Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in March 1948 reveal deep concerns about 
French obstruction to German economic unity. The French continue to veto any policy 
that would allow for central German authority. They have been the most determined 
opponent of economic unification of Germany and the establishment of central German 
agency. They will not likely relent until the Ruhr issue is settled.67 The French were not 
included in the Potsdam Conference and did not consider themselves bound by the 
agreement. At the start of the occupation, the French wanted the Ruhr separated from 
Germany, but by 1948, they had become willing to talk about other options, such as 
internationalization of the Ruhr.  
By 1947, the issue of the Ruhr became central. The United States had staked its 
hope for future European prosperity on this rich industrial district. Despite concerns over 
a renewal of German economic power in Europe and the Soviet desire to gain access to 
the its industrial output, the United States became steadfast in its determination to find a 
solution to using the Ruhr’s industrial output to revive Western Europe. US State 
Department documents addressed these policy concerns: “unfettered German control of 
the vital coal and iron and steel resources of the Ruhr would leave many European 
countries which are deeply dependent on the Ruhr at the mercy of Germany.” However, 
“Means must therefore be found to reconcile the varying interests of European countries 
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in the export of Ruhr coal and steel.”68 Policy concerning the Ruhr followed a similar 
transformation to other policy over German economic prosperity. Early apprehension 
over German industrial power gave way to a policy that promoted both a prosperity and 
multilateralism, which was inclusive of Germany. 
At the Moscow CFM in March 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov stated his nation’s position—German economic unity and a reparations 
agreement were inseparable. Molotov complained that the Soviets were being excluded 
by the United States from forming economic ties to the Ruhr and its rightful claim to 
reparations. Molotov conferred that the Soviet Union was ready to account for every 
kopek of reparations removed from the Eastern zone and that Potsdam did not prohibit 
reparations from German current production. The Soviets were not willing to agree to the 
economic unity of Germany until quadripartite control of the Ruhr was established.69 
Molotov’s complaint seemed reminiscent of one that Ribbentrop and Mussolini had 
registered during the early stages of WWII. As an economic superpower, the United 
States had the power to set the rules for the global market and the ability to set 
boundaries, which could include or exclude other nations. 
The final act of the division of Germany was the West German currency reform in 
June 1948. Economic recovery was impossible unless the inflationary effect of a 
worthless currency was replaced with a new currency issued on a bizonal basis.70 The 
new currency was printed for the Western zones only, definitively separating the 
economy of the Western zones from the Eastern zones. This was a purely Western Allied 
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measure and was an unmistakable sign that any hope of unification was over.71 By 1948, 
the United States had completely changed its policy and currency reform, halted 
reparation payments to the Soviet, and denied Soviet participation in the Ruhr, all severed 
to divide Germany for the purpose of the restoration of economic prosperity in the 
Western zones.   
A “West” German Recovery 
The story of postwar Germany, at least for the Western portion, was a story of 
struggle at first and then recovery. In 1920, John Maynard Keynes wrote in Economic 
Consequences of the Peace, “Round Germany as a central support the rest of the 
European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of 
Germany the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended. The increasing 
pace of Germany gave her neighbors an outlet for their products, in exchange for which 
the enterprise of the German merchant supplied them with their chief requirements at a 
low price.”72 However, in 1948, after 34 years of war and suffering, Germany’s reluctant 
neighbors would have to be willing to accept its return to free and independent status; 
Europe’s prosperity depended on it.73 Besides the pressure exerted by the United States, 
there were other forces helping to push Germany’s acceptance into the European 
market.74 The slow rate of recovery during the first few years of the occupation and the 
increasing sense of a Soviet threat helped to persuade Germany’s European neighbors 
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that a strong and democratic West Germany under the tutelage of the United States was 
the best hope for a peaceful and prosperous Europe.  
By 1948, two and a half years of occupation had passed, and recovery in both 
Germany and Europe was stalled. Germany had been divided clearing the way for the 
application for multilateralism among the Western Allies. A European market, which 
included West Germany, would now be given a chance to fulfill the expectations of 
recovery. A new set of State Department officials could finally take the lead and set in 
motion the proposals of early postwar planners, reviving Western Europe with the 
creation of a multilateral commercial system. 
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Chapter V 
1947–1948: An Integrated West Germany 
Introduction  
 
 The start of the Cold War coincided with the emergence of a Western-orientated 
multilateral world economy. By 1947, it became clear to US officials that the German 
problem, the economic unity of the German nation, was not solvable, but that the 
European problem, rebuilding a prosperous European economy, was. The economic 
recovery of a united Germany was being prevented by a policy conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, with no foreseeable solution in sight. The division of 
Germany into East and West was predicated by the necessity of Western powers to close 
off their zones from the Soviet zone to secure multilateralism and, thus, prosperity. By 
1947, the nature of partition had changed. Before 1947, partition signified a division of 
the nation of Germany; from 1947 on, partition signified the separation of an 
international capitalist Western economy from Soviet controlled Eastern European 
economy. Multilateralism was initially intended by the US State Department to include 
most of the world; by 1948 they had to accept a smaller region that excluded the Soviets 
and Eastern Europe. The Cold War partition had implications beyond the German border, 
West Germany became more than just a dividing line between East and West; it 
developed into the centerpiece of what was to become a Western European economic 
engine. 
George C. Marshall was sworn in as Secretary of State in January 1947. His main 
objective was to find a solution for the crisis in Europe. The ongoing economic 
stagnation of Europe was raising concerns within the US government about an advance 
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of communist influence on the continent. One of the first measures taken by Secretary 
Marshall was the creation of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) under the direction of 
George F. Kennan. The purpose of the staff was to create foreign policy 
recommendations for the crisis in Europe. Kennan, an acknowledged Soviet expert, was 
directed to develop a European Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP would be a departure 
from the piecemeal approach to handing out aid; participants would have to organize the 
rehabilitation of the continent on an integrated basis. It became a turning point in US 
foreign policy because for the first time, the United States forcefully injected itself into 
European affairs during peacetime by granting large amounts of financial aid.1 At 
Kennan’s recommendation, US policy was not to be directed at combating communism, 
but to restore the economic health of Europe. Aid to Europe was formulated with 
initiatives that required economic multilateralism, not ideological preconditions; Europe 
was to be saved by economic collaboration and free trade. The goal of the ERP can be 
recognized as the aspiration of what early postwar planners at the State Department had 
first recommended in 1939. 
The ERP was made available to all nations of Europe, including the Soviets. 
Marshall, along with other State Department officials questioned Kennan’s 
recommendation allowing for Soviet participation. They were concerned that Soviet 
involvement would sabotage the program, but Kennan urged Marshall to play it straight 
and extend the offer to Stalin.2 This was a difficult proposal for Marshall to accept, as the 
need to develop an ERP for Europe was caused by an unyielding Soviet policy in 
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Germany to some extent. The Soviets had been acting without regard for the other 
occupation zones and were enforcing closed economic polices elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe. It was during the ERP negotiations that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 
challenged the US State Department’s approach of an integrated multilateral European 
reconstruction program. Molotov insisted on a nation-based approach. Aid should be 
allocated to individual counties, without multilateral strings attached. Molotov and Stalin 
were not interested in free trade and knew that in an open-door competition, their county 
was no match for the American economic juggernaut.3 The development of the ERP 
highlighted the friction between the United States and the Soviets over the role of 
Germany in European redevelopment. Were the economic resources of Germany to be 
used to rebuild Europe or the Soviet Union? 
When it came time to negotiate over ERP funding, the Soviets were not the only 
nations reluctant to think beyond their own nationalist goals. In the summer of 1947, 
sixteen nations met in Paris to form the Committee of European Economic Co-operation 
(CEEC), an organization formed to make recommendations as to the nature and 
disbursement of ERP aid. During negotiations, it became evident that most nations were 
still mired in nationalism. They sought out funds with the intent of improving their 
position among their fellow nations. CEEC committees could not come to agreement on a 
European wide policy that would transcend individual nationalistic priorities.4 When it 
came to Germany, Clay and the military were not immune from this position; they 
insisted that Germany should be administered as a separate and special recipient of ERP 
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funds.5 General Clay was concerned that Germany’s neighbors would design a plan that 
would be a detrimental to the recovery of West Germany. He was correct in his 
assessment; the initial CEEC recommendations called for a recovery rate for Germany 
that was too low.6 Nearly all the policy recommendations made by the sixteen CEEC 
members did not meet with US State Department approval and had to be reworked to fit a 
the proposed multilateral structure. 
US occupation forces were not inclined to promote multilateral policy in 
Germany. From the start of the occupation, Clay preferred to approach economic 
problems from a German as opposed to a European perspective. An increasing level of 
antagonism with the Soviets compounded this dilemma. Daily decisions were made on 
the basis of short-term results with the intention of alleviating the occupation’s financial 
burdens. US State Department records point to disagreements over the application of 
funds between the military and the State Department during the first three years of the 
occupation. State Department documents report, “Issues which have arisen involved the 
rather narrow view of German interests taken by the Army Department, restricted as it is 
by the specific purposes for which its funds were appropriated, as against the Department 
of State’s interest in over-all western European recovery.”7 As difficulties with the 
Soviets increased in Germany, there was concern at the State Department over the 
expanding influence of the War Department over foreign policy. With the focus shifting 
from economic to military issues, State Department planners were concerned that they 
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had little say in shaping occupation policy.8 As the crisis in Berlin drew closer, it became 
necessary to leave Clay and the military in charge although their ideas clashed with the 
State Department’s.9 There were some positive, unintended consequences for the German 
economy as a result of the confrontation with the Soviets. As tensions with the Soviets 
increased, American military officials were able to justify accelerating industrial 
production in the Ruhr and other sectors in the Western zones. Eventually, Washington 
was able to legitimately override concerns from France and other European nations about 
increasing German production under the portent of a looming Soviet threat.   
In January 1948, Secretary Marshall announced that the State Department was 
ready to take over control of the occupation in Germany. Although this had been a long-
term goal of both the Army and State Departments, the timing seemed premature.10 1948 
turned out to be a year of dramatic change in Germany as the Soviets were increasingly 
left out of policy planning made among Western European allies. February saw the start 
of the London Six Power Conference, which included the United States, France, Great 
Britain, and the Benelux countries, but excluded the Soviet Union. These talks led to the 
formation of West Germany. In March, the first forms of the Soviet blockade of Berlin 
started. In June, a separate currency reform was rolled out in the Western zones. Finally, 
in September, a parliamentary council assembled in Bonn to draft a constitution for a 
West German government. Clay, who had expected to be leaving Germany by 1948, was 
asked to stay because of the escalation of tensions.  
The increasing potential for hostilities with the Soviets changed the nature of the 
so-called German problem. Starting in 1947, Germany’s neighbors began to realize that 
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they might have to accept a stronger Germany as a buffer to Soviet power. Because of 
Germany’s recent history of military aggression, Germany’s neighbors were wary of 
accepting its return to independent status. At the end of WWII, there was a great potential 
for Germany to return to a position of strength, and its citizens seemed willing to make 
the necessary sacrifices to rebuild its industrial economy. Germany possessed a large 
industrial capacity that was ready to take full advantage of any spike in foreign demand. 
German workers were willing to contribute to the reconstruction of Germany by 
accepting lower wages, thereby creating higher profit levels leading to an increase in 
additional investment capital. The German middle-class was willing to accept a currency 
reform by which small holders would lose their savings while the value of the industrial 
capitalists remained unaffected. In the Western zones, the United States and Great Britain 
had been leaving industrial capital largely intact.11 Conditions were different in East 
Germany where the Soviets had been removing large amounts of industrial capital in the 
form of reparations. As antagonisms with the Soviets mounted, US policy in the West 
increasingly promoted economic prosperity; meanwhile, Soviet policy in the East was 
promoting political solutions that would improve Soviet security. 
The introduction of multilateralism into the European economic system through 
the application of ERP aid was seen by the US State Department as a necessity, even if it 
led to the eventual division of Germany. Kennan advised Marshall to leave the door open 
to the Soviets and all of Eastern Europe to participate in the program, an option that 
Kennan was sure Stalin would not take.12 Kennan knew that a multilateral form of 
international commerce was inconsistent with Soviet policy. He felt strongly that the 
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Soviets would never allow multilateral interaction between East European nations and the 
West, and was therefore convinced that the Soviets would reject the plan.13 Stalin was 
initially interested in negotiations for ERP aid but started to lose interest once he learned 
that funds would be applied on a multilateral basis. The introduction of the ERP in 1947 
meant that Stalin had to make a choice, either cooperate in a multilateral free trade 
economy or have the eastern half of both Germany and Europe cutoff from a growing 
Western prosperity.       
State Department Policy: 1947–1948 
1947 brought a sense of urgency to the conditions in Germany and Europe. In 
May, Clayton returned from a tour of the region and was shocked by the breakdown of 
economic activity. All US governmental officials familiar with the conditions felt the 
situation called for immediate action. From the fall of 1946 through the spring of 1947, 
there was a critical shortage of coal during what turned out to be an exceptionally cold 
winter. This was compounded by a severe drought and a persistent food shortage.14 With 
food shortages, coal shortages, and a lack of dollars to pay for imports, Western Germany 
and much of Western Europe was on the brink of disaster. American officials grew 
concerned that Europe would be vulnerable to communist influence.15 In response, 
Truman called on the US State Department to act immediately and with substance.16 The 
initial concept for the ERP originated in the economic section of the State Department in 
1946, but it was the crisis of 1947 that brought on a sense of urgency. It was this 
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heightened state of concern of the Truman Administration that pressured a fiscally 
conservative Congress to allow the State Department to act decisively with substantial 
ERP funding.17 
The design and implementation of the ERP was dependent on multilateral 
cooperation among European nations. Up until 1947, Soviet controlled Eastern Europe 
had not acted in this manner. Kennan, who headed the PPS found himself responsible for 
the articulation of American global policy, with the salvation of European capitalism as 
his top priority.18 The PPS was immediately thrown into the ERP. Policy papers confirm 
that by 1948 the State Department was abandoning its policy on German unification as a 
necessary precondition of European recovery. Kennan had concluded that the failure to 
treat Germany as an economic unit was the result of the Soviet Union refusing to 
implement common policies with respect to foreign trade and reparation removals. 
Because of the ERP, the emphasis of US policy with regard to Germany had to be 
changed from active concentration on the achievement of economic unity to the full-scale 
participation of bizonal Germany in the recovery of Western Europe. Kennan called for 
an increase in the present levels of industrial production to double in order to meet the 
new requirements.19 This was a decisive change in policy. Previously, the State 
Department was willing to forego full-scale German industrial production for the 
possibility of uniting Germany and the development of an egalitarian multilateral Europe. 
However, Kennan pointed out that the prosperity of a multilateral Europe was dependent 
on full-scale production in Germany and the US State Department was willing to divide 
Germany to achieve this goal.   
                                                 
17 Bischof, “The Advent of Neo-Revisionism?,” 149. 
18 State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. Germany and Austria,” 1288. 
19 Ibid., 1309. 
                                                                                                                                  
 
141
 
By 1947, there was a convergence of support among US government departments 
in favor of a proactive multilateral foreign policy for Western Europe, a formation in 
which West Germany would play a leading role.20 Both the Executive and Legislative 
branches supported multilateral policy. Congressional support for ERP funding depended 
on a multilateral concept by stipulating that legislation must be framed as aid for Europe 
and not a series of individual countries.21 The perception of a Soviet threat was a key 
factor in the consolidation of US support for a proactive policy. By 1948, concerns by US 
officials over Soviet influence in Europe helped to create a consensus, changing the tide 
of support away from a fiscal conservative agenda to a foreign policy based on a 
proactive multilateral approach to European affairs. 
A central stipulation of US multilateralism was that Western European nations 
must accept West German integration. Not all Europeans were in agreement on the 
benefits of multilateral integration, especially with Germany. Considering the past thirty 
years of history, many Germans and their neighbors were not willing to accept the 
integration of the West German economy into Europe. In 1947, to many Germans, 
integration meant granting license to France, Belgium, and Switzerland to use German 
resources for their own benefit without corresponding benefits for Germany.22 Most other 
European nations were looking for a sizable financial aid package before they would 
agree to open up their national economies to international competition. When the US 
State Department first announced the ERP, they expected Western European nations to 
willingly help construct a plan that would ensure West German integration. PPS policy 
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papers addressed this issue. Kennan wrote, “Our present objective is, together with the 
United Kingdom and France, to reconstitute Western Germany as a political entity 
capable of participating in and contributing to the reconstruction of Europe in respect to 
economic life and the general security.”23 Despite early expectations of cooperation 
among ERP participants, the State Department soon came to recognize that Western 
European nations would not willingly give up economic sovereignty. 
As late as 1947, a punitive JCS1067 was still the official policy position of the 
United States. A new directive, JCS1779, released in July 1947, had been under 
consideration since the summer of 1945. From 1945 through 1947, there had been a 
gradual and unofficial transition of policy toward the promotion of German industrial 
prosperity. At the time of Byrnes’s Stuttgart speech in 1946, much of JCS1779 was 
already in effect. 24 It was likely that JCS1067 was kept in effect as a backup position 
until the United States had a clearer understanding of Soviet motives. A punitive policy 
would not be completely ruled out as long as there was a possibility of reaching an 
agreement with the Soviets.25 The turning point for the official change in US policy came 
in June 1947 when the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vjaceslav Molotov, walked out on the 
Paris ERP negotiations. The United States and its Western allies then started to 
coordinate an economic recovery without concern for the Soviet Union. Finally, in July 
1947, with the release of JCS1779, the unofficial policy of restoring the German 
economy became official. 
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 The ERP was the centerpiece of US postwar planning; its main goal was identical 
to what early planners had in mind, an integrated system of trade liberalization. State 
Department documents from 1948 assert “It is US policy that the fullest possible 
recognition be given this interdependence in order to achieve the greatest over-all 
benefits for the European Recovery Program.”26 For a variety of reasons, West Germany 
was to play a central role in the implementation of this program. It had the industrial 
potential to be the driving force behind European economic growth, it could be directly 
influenced by the presence of US troops, and its economic development could be directed 
by the US State Department.27 American funds were critical to restarting West Germany 
commercial trade; from 1945–1948, the United States financed 66 percent of all German 
imports, and 39 percent in 1949. This was important because, at the time, Germany did 
not have the currency reserves to purchase the raw materials needed to restart its 
equipment manufacturing industry.28 The reduction of trade barriers alone would not 
restore a commercial system. Most economists at the State Department prescribed two 
other ingredients: full employment and the application of ERP aid for a period of three to 
four years.29 The main problem was that after the war, most nations had a poor balance of 
payments, (i.e., they had little in currency reserves from which to pay for imports). ERP 
funds were intended to bridge this gap by providing a much needed dollar reserve to be 
used for international trade. 
To further enhance commercial trade, in July 1945, the United States and its allies 
formed the International Trade Organization (ITO), with the goal of releasing 
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international commerce from the restraints of protectionism and tariff barriers. The State 
Department was determined to gain West German inclusion in these international trade 
organizations. State Department policy papers from 1948 recommended that the United 
States sponsor German membership in the ITO and its successor organization General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These efforts initially failed, but the State 
Department was successful in gaining most-favored-nation treatment for Germany from 
other ERP members as a condition of their participation. In the meantime, the United 
States was conducting trade with Germany in a manner that was in full accord with ITO 
policies.30 
Disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union over the economic 
development of Germany helped ignite the start of the Cold War. From 1945 to 1947, 
policy toward Germany was still punitive in nature and did not seek partition. Even as 
late as 1948, some State department officials, including Kennan, still held out some hope 
for unification. The failure by this late date to produce a four-power agreement caused 
the United States to reverse its policy stand.31 State Department policy papers from 1948 
illustrate that the members of the PPS placed blame on the Soviet Union, stating, “It was 
made clear that the price to be extracted of the Western powers for an agreed solution of 
the German problem was Soviet-Communist control over the economic and political life 
of all of Germany.”32 The inability to resolve this issue came to a head at the CFM 
meeting held in London on December 1947, as an agreement was still out of reach. From 
this point on, US policy was to pursue the division of Western German from the East 
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with an emphasis on the development of a strong and independent West German state. 
Officially, the United States had not given up hope of renewed four-power discussions in 
the future, nor did it completely abandon hope for unification; however, the present 
situation in Germany called for urgent solutions to economic and political problems.33 
The United States government would no longer wait for an agreement to restore healthy 
economic conditions in Germany. 
 By the summer of 1948, the new goal of the United States was to ensure that a 
soon-to-be constituted West German state make a vital contribution to the economic 
rehabilitation and political stability of Europe. Western Germany had to gain the 
acceptance of the United Kingdom and France as a prerequisite before its integration into 
a Western European economic system. The shared use of German recourses for the 
purpose of creating a Western European prosperity was a critical inducement for West 
German acceptance.34 From February through June of 1948, a Six-Power Conference was 
held in London, specifically addressing the creation of the new West Germany state. 
These talks included the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux 
countries. The tone of the conference was set by a communiqué released in March 1948 
and recommended that to confirm the availability of coal, coke, and steel to all of 
Western Europe, it had been decided that there must be a close association between all 
economies involved in the ERP. The Ruhr must not be separated from Germany, but an 
agency, the International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR), must be created by the Six-
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Powers to control distribution and production of the Ruhr resources.35 This agency would 
not include the Soviets, and thus a major obstacle in negotiations had been removed. 
Control of the Ruhr could now be made within the confines of West European 
considerations. By the exclusion of the Soviets, it was anticipated that agreements over 
the distribution of resources from the Ruhr region would be easier to attain.  
A new West German state combining the US, British, and French zones linked to 
US multilateral policy objectives was taking shape. Under the recommendations of 
Kennan and the PPS, the Western portion of Germany was removed from an ineffective 
quadripartite control and was reconstituted as an independent nation back in pursuit of 
economic prosperity closely aligned with the Western powers. PPS documents advised 
that West German independence could only be accomplished by a complete withdrawal 
from the Allied Control Council (ACC); therefore, the best policy path would be to 
proceed with vigorous implementation of the London Conference recommendations.36 
This new policy would directly undermine the authority of the ACC. On March 20, 1948, 
the last ACC meeting was held and the Soviet representative, Vasily Sokolovsky, walked 
out.37 This abrupt end to the ACC was due to Soviet resentment over their exclusion from 
having any say in the distribution of resources from the Ruhr. The ACC was finished, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union had undermined quadripartite control, and 
the division of Germany was final. 
 No policy had done more to finalize the division of Germany than the 
implementation in June of 1948 of a separate currency for West Germany; perhaps no 
policy has been given more credit for German economic recovery than that same 
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currency reform. Reconstruction took off after currency reform; it is often referred to as 
“day one” of the new Germany.38 The new Deutschemark was not the origin of German 
recovery, but it was a necessary prerequisite, a critical measure allowing a slow recovery 
to gain momentum.39 The new functioning currency brought stability to the market place. 
Shop owners could confidently stock their shelves, and industrial capitalists could 
accurately calculate profits and make stable investment decisions. The psychological 
impact of the currency reform combined with the knowledge of German participation in 
the ERP added to a growing confidence in recovery. 
The US State Department had been eager to create the new currency since 1946, 
but it had to wait for the right time. Being in a powerful position as an occupier, it was 
easier for the United States to enforce a new currency than for a democratically elected 
German parliament. The opportunity presented itself in June 1948, immediately after the 
breakup of the ACC. Without Soviet interference; the remaining Western allies had no 
difficulty in agreeing on the terms. Initially, each German could exchange, on a one-to-
one basis, sixty old Reichsmarks for sixty new Deutschemarks. Subsequent exchanges of 
old currency for Deutschemarks was limited to 100 to 6.5, eliminating 93.5% of old 
currency.40 Many middle income Germans with money in the bank found that their 
previous savings had been drained and replaced with a smaller starting amount of the new 
currency. Industrialist’s had a strong financial incentive to support currency reform. It   
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heavily favored capital owners whose fixed capital assets were unaffected by the 
conversion.41  
With the onset of the Soviet blockade in the summer of 1948, Berlin became the 
symbolic focal point in what was to become the Cold War. In the spring of that year, 
Clay had expressed his confidence to Secretary Marshall that as long as the United States 
held its ground, he had no fear of military aggression by Soviet forces and that 
Communism had lost its opportunity to capture Germany.42 In the opinions of the United 
States and other Western powers, Berlin had become a symbol of firmness from which no 
retreat was possible. The London Agreements and the Blockade of Berlin helped to create 
a new image for West Germany, one of integrity, a nation of freedom loving people 
holding the front lines against the Soviet aggressors. Despite the new image, the series of 
events and failed negotiations that separated East Germany from West Germany did not 
come about as an internal dynamic or a choice made by the German people. A separate 
West German nation with a separate economic recovery fully integrated onto a 
multilateral Western block of nations was an external process decided on by its occupiers, 
particularly the US State Department. The roots of this external process can be traced 
back to policy generated in 1939 by early postwar planners at the US State Department. 
The European Recovery Program and West Germany 
Through the influence of ERP funds, the United States was able to compel the 
European market into the use of a multilateral commercial system. One main 
precondition was that West Germany was to be included. There has been a significant 
debate among historians regarding the value of ERP aid to the European recovery. The 
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inquiry centers on whether internal European trade networks or the external influence and 
aid provided by the United States generated economic recovery. The debate often focuses 
on who benefited from the aid; the impact of ERP aid was not recognized equally by all 
participating nations. Most historians would agree that it was more important to the 
recovery of West Germany than to most other European nations. As the dominant 
occupier, the United States had direct influence on the West German economy and could 
direct its interactions. Whereas it can be debated as to what degree the recovery of 
individual European nations was enhanced by the efforts of the United States, the 
application of US aid by use of a multilateral approach was critical to the creation of an 
interdependent structure of international commerce in Europe and was decisive to the 
inclusion of West Germany.  
Before the successful return of West German commercial trade to the 
international stage, the concerns of other nations had to be addressed. To a great extent, 
the perception of a Soviet threat from Eastern Europe went a long way in allowing West 
German integration into West European international markets. However, the application 
of ERP funds as leverage by the United States was also important in promoting the return 
of West Germany. For example, on three different occasions in 1948, European nations 
were asked to give both West Germany and Japan most-favored-nation trade status as a 
condition of receiving ERP funds.43 This request encountered considerable resistance 
from French and British Foreign Service officials and Western European domestic labor 
organizations. The United States was eventually able to convince European nations to 
concede to most-favored-nation trade status for West Germany, but not for Japan.44 Any 
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major industrial economy, like Germany or Japan, even though they had been recent 
enemies, would be an important contributor to a global marketplace.   
In the immediate postwar period, most European nations intended on paying for 
the reconstruction of their economies by increasing their exports. The US State 
Department recognized that a shortage of available foreign currency in Europe would 
derail these plans. The value of postwar foreign trade varied from nation to nation. In 
1949, the trade/ per-capita as a percentage of national income was in 71.3%Belgium, 
30.3% in France, and 39.4% in Britain.45 Nations like France and Britain could 
conceivably establish their own national economies first and later negotiate a more 
beneficial trade deal. Other European nations like Germany, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands were in an immediate need to reestablish a trade network. Perhaps the most 
significant aspect of the ERP was the financial capability given to West German allowing 
it to participate in the international commercial market.46 In mid-1949, the Organization 
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the successor organization to the CEEC, 
was set up by seventeen nations to allocate ERP funds and administer policy decisions. 
They immediately began to promote trade deals and make tariff reductions that affected 
50% of all European trade. However, the solution to the problem involved more than just 
reducing tariffs. Before full implementation of tariff restrictions could occur, nations had 
to resolve their balance of payments problems. With so many countries looking to 
dramatically increase exports, there was no viable mechanism by which international 
payment settlements could be balanced other than returning to highly restrictive bilateral 
trade agreements. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 addressed this issue, but its 
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scope was too small to fix the problem. Large balance of payment discrepancies persisted 
through the end of the decade. ERP funds proved to be crucial. By providing currency in 
the form of dollars necessary to pay for imports, the United States helped generate a 
multilateral trade in the seventeen participants as a whole.47 This environment of 
expanding exports helped to create prosperity among the participating nations and pushed 
ERP participants to eventually develop a model of European economic integration similar 
to what had been proposed by early postwar planners at the US State Department.  
The forceful position of the United States as a sponsor was a key component of 
West Germany reacceptance to the community of nations. This process was facilitated in 
a number of ways. The United States insisting that West Germany become a member of 
the OEEC was a factor in creating the preconditions that allowed Germany’s return to the 
world economy.48 West Germany’s neighbors had concerns about a powerful and 
independent West Germany eventually dominating the market.49 To resolve these 
objections, the US State Department was successful in formulating a policy by which the 
recourses from the Ruhr could be used as a basis for an exchange of trade that would 
benefit other Western nations. The United States also solved other problems that could 
have hindered the acceptance of a West Germany state by its European neighbors. The 
ERP resolved the reparations problem for Western Europe by providing a financial 
alternative to receiving German reparation payments. The United States provided the 
political framework for West Germany to develop as a stable democratic state. Perhaps 
most importantly, the combined effect of these factors led to the removal of economic 
uncertainty. West German participation under the direct supervision of the United States 
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led to political, economic, and military stability; the value of these conditions to the 
development of an international commercial system cannot be underestimated. By 
securing the division of Germany, the United States was successful in creating a West 
German safe zone suitable for its inclusion in a multilateral commercial system that was 
closely tied to Western capitalist ideals. A secure and capitalist West Germany was a 
better outcome than the uncertainty of never-ending negotiations with the Soviets over a 
united Germany. The US State Department policy set the stage for a powerful industrial 
nation centrally located on the European continent to fully participate in a future 
capitalist world market without concerns for past German notions, like lebensraum, 
autarchy, or beggar-thy-neighbor policies, or new concerns over communist infiltration. 
From this point forward, a powerful German industrial economy could be safely 
reconnected within the European community of nations with the purpose of producing 
international prosperity. 
The application of the ERP to the particular region of Europe was important. 
Europe, unlike other parts of the world, was capable of sustaining a higher level of 
multilateral exchange and had a long history of industrial production.50 The United States 
was not interested in a New Deal program for the world, but aid given to redevelop 
Europe would pay off in the long run for the US economy. The industrial nature of both 
the European and American economies meant that both of their fates were tied together. 
In a speech given in 1947, Marshall expressed his ideas about a special connection 
between the United States and Europe. The United States does not want to fill the 
European vacuum with American, Soviet, or even German power. Europe must be a 
community of nations, not dominated by a single power. It is the divergence of interest 
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over the condition of Europe that causes the difference between the Soviets and the 
United States. Marshall clearly defined the Soviets as an opponent of economic recovery 
while the United States was promoting prosperity.51 Marshall went on about the 
important position of Europe. The enlightened interests of the Unites States coincides 
with the best interests of Europe. Europe is an advance civilization of which the United 
States is a part; the United States’ national traditions have their foundation in Europe. 
The USSR does not share this purpose; if the USSR prevails, a prosperous Europe cannot 
be reestablished. Marshall states, “The logic of history would appear to dictate the 
necessity of this community, drawing closer together not only for its own survival, but for 
the stability, prosperity, and peace of the entire world.”52  
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 Conclusion 
 
The West German economy came to thrive in the post-WWII era. By 1950, West 
Germany had returned to the world market with a vengeance. The 1945 to 1950 period of 
transformation coincided with the full force of the US occupation and was marked by a 
number of dramatic changes to the organization of both the German and European 
economies. These changes were initiated by a policy in which its roots can be traced back 
to the early postwar planning done in 1939 by US State Department officials and their 
partners at the Council of Foreign Relations. The United States contributed to the 
establishment of a European wide system of prosperity based on a multilateral trade that 
included the West German industrial economy as a central player. This course of events 
went against the natural impulse of nations to reintroduce economic nationalism in the 
postwar period. During the first half of the twentieth century, Europe became 
increasingly nationalistic. During the post-WWII occupation period, this trend was 
starting to reverse. To encourage economic prosperity, the United States expected 
European nations to surrender a portion of their economic sovereignty for all trading 
partners to benefit from a mutual prosperity with the expectation that this would lead to 
peace. 
There were other dramatic changes that occurred during the occupational period 
that can be attributed to US foreign policy to some extent. In 1948, Germany transitioned 
from a planned economy to a liberal economy. Germany, more than any other industrial 
nation, had a history of planned economies. Germany’s; the nation’s natural bent toward 
order and organization predisposed Germany in favor of control. In 1948, the choice to 
change course was not without significance. The transition to free markets was not 
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completed in 1948, but the general trend was established. US policy deserves 
considerable credit for Germany taking the first steps toward market liberalization, a 
trend that was gradually accepted and eventually intensified by German industry.  
The United States played a major role in the division of Germany. As a result, the 
United States can accept credit for advancing the economic prosperity in Western 
Europe, but the burden of the Cold War animosity fell heavy on both the European 
continent and the US taxpayer. It is ironic that US State Department officials who were 
the most opposed to partition before 1947 were, in the end, the officials most responsible 
for the division of Germany. There is a remote possibility that full cooperation with the 
Soviets from the start of the occupation might have unified Germany, but the State 
Department would have had to give up on its multilateral doctrine. A postwar 
international commercial system of trade under a Soviet dominated Europe would not 
have been much better than an international trading system under a German fascist 
dominated Europe.   
West Germany became an essential part of European economic success. The 
international free trade order pursued by the United States in the postwar period benefited 
a German industrial base whose potential productive capacity was ready to restart. As an 
exporter of producer goods, it stood to gain from a freer international movement of 
capital goods. As a by-product of economic recovery came the possibility of a remade 
culture image through the representation of a powerful German entrepreneurial economy, 
West Germans could put aside the shadows of the recent past to develop a new cultural 
image based on economic success and prosperity, a national redemption embodied in a 
new commercial spirit. This was at the heart of what early postwar planners at the US 
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State Department had envisaged—a change in the German psyche based on using an 
economic process to effect cultural change and to produce a wholesome democratic 
psychology that would be compatible with the American notion of international 
commerce. 
There is no doubt that there was a dramatic change in attitude of the United States 
during the post-WWII period toward an increased involvement in international affairs. 
The United States reversed its prewar isolationism and advanced a proactive foreign 
policy. It now seems clear that US isolationism during the interwar period was 
detrimental to peace and prosperity of the world and that US leadership during the 
postwar era was both beneficial and stabilizing. Most historians recognize this change in 
attitude, but still debate to what extent US foreign policy can claim responsibility for the 
return of European prosperity. There was no question in the mind of Clay and nearly all 
US officials present during the occupation that the ERP saved the free nations of Europe. 
Still, historians like Alan Milward argue that US policy like the ERP and Bretton Woods 
Agreements had little effect on European economic recovery. Whether the ERP or the 
Bretton Woods Agreements were individually successful in lifting the economies of 
individual European nations misses the point. During the post-1945 period, the United 
States, the world’s most powerful economic engine, became fully engaged in the 
promotion of a multilateral European prosperity. Whether a particular program or 
agreement succeeded in the recovery of an individual country pales in respect to the 
overall success of US foreign policy to partner with a grouping of European nations to 
create a functional international commercial market.  
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In 1947, the multilateral economic system proposed by the early postwar planners 
at the US State Department was confronting an increasingly antagonistic Soviet force in 
Germany. The solution of this dilemma became a defining moment in the start of the 
Cold War. The only viable option for the United States was to separate a multilateral 
West Germany from a Soviet dominated East Germany. This division ensured that a 
group of Western capitalist nations could rebuild a prosperous international economy 
through economic cooperation. The Marxist theory of imperialism contends that capitalist 
nations will continually start wars with other capitalists over the expanding forces of 
imperialism. Stalin believed that this was a root cause of WWII and that it was just a 
matter of time before capitalist nations would once again start an international conflict. 
Officials at the US State Department had a different outlook for the possibility of 
cooperation among capitalist nations. They believed that capitalist nations could 
cooperate to generate prosperity under the guise of free trade and market liberalization. A 
close examination of the post-WWII Europe makes it clear that under an environment of 
international cooperation capitalist, nations can work together to create international 
economic prosperity.  
What became of postwar West Germany was considered by most to be a 
remarkable success—the growth of a powerful and prosperous economy, a stable 
democracy, an integrated part of a larger European market, and a proponent for world 
peace and security. The long-term planning and diplomatic efforts made by the US State 
Department to include postwar Germany in an egalitarian multilateral international 
market must be considered as a key factor in this outcome.        
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